



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1975

The integration of Spain into Europe and its effect on American military presence in Spain.

Ruskosky, Gale Arnold

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/20906>

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

THE INTEGRATION OF SPAIN
INTO EUROPE AND ITS EFFECT ON
AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN

Gale Arnold Ruskosky

Library
Marine Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE INTEGRATION OF SPAIN
INTO EUROPE AND ITS EFFECT ON
AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN

by

Gale Arnold Ruskosky

March 1975

Thesis Advisor:

Mark Janis

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

T165941

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Integration of Spain into Europe and Its Effect on American Military Presence in Spain		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; March 1975
7. AUTHOR(•) Gale Arnold Ruskosky		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(•)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE March 1975
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 134
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Spain U.S.-Spain Base Rights European Integration American Foreign Policy		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) In 1939, at the beginning of the Franco regime, Spain and the United States had few foreign policy relationships. But beginning with the Pact of Madrid in 1953 and continuing with the Agreement for Mutual Cooperation in 1970, Spain and the U.S. moved to a bilateral mutually beneficial relationship. The basic exchange has been American military and economic aid in return for Spanish permission to maintain American forces		

(20. ABSTRACT Continued)

at four bases in Spain. While the U.S. retains a strong influence on Spanish foreign policy, there are increasingly important relationships between Spain and Europe and with the Arab World. These latter two relationships, and in particular the European link have caused Spain to begin to shift some of its present dependence from the U.S. to Europe in order to better realize its goals, i.e. economic prosperity, international equality, security, stability, the accession of Gibraltar, and protection of its place in the Sahara. Therefore, even if the U.S. seeks to maintain its military presence in Spain, the Franco or post-Franco government will promote the integration of Spain into Europe. This will probably mean decreased American influence on Spanish policy and an uncertain prospect for American bases in Spain.

The Integration of Spain
into Europe and its Effect on
American Military Presence in Spain

by

Gale Arnold Ruskosky
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Saint Olaf College, 1968

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 1975

Theresa
B. 1922
R. 11

ABSTRACT

In 1939, at the beginning of the Franco regime, Spain and the United States had few foreign policy relationships. But beginning with the Pact of Madrid in 1953 and continuing with the Agreement for Mutual Cooperation in 1970, Spain and the U.S. moved to a bilateral mutually beneficial relationship. The basic exchange has been American military and economic aid in return for Spanish permission to maintain American forces at four bases in Spain. While the U.S. retains a strong influence on Spanish foreign policy, there are increasingly important relationships between Spain and Europe and with the Arab World. These latter two relationships, and in particular the European link have caused Spain to begin to shift some of its present dependence from the U.S. to Europe in order to better realize its goals, i.e. economic prosperity, international equality, security, stability, the accession of Gibraltar, and protection of its place in the Sahara. Therefore, even if the U.S. seeks to maintain its military presence in Spain, the Franco or post-Franco government will promote the integration of Spain into Europe. This will probably mean decreased American influence on Spanish policy and an uncertain prospect for American bases in Spain.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	7
II.	HISTORY OF SPANISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS -----	10
	A. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR -----	10
	B. WORLD WAR II -----	13
	C. POST WORLD WAR II -----	17
III.	SPANISH-AMERICAN BASE AGREEMENTS -----	21
	A. THE PACT OF MADRID, 1953 -----	22
	1. United States Policy Change -----	22
	2. Spanish Policy Change -----	28
	3. Spain and the United States Agree -----	32
	4. The Period from 1953-1968 -----	37
	B. THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, 1970 -----	40
	1. United States Need for Bases in Spain --	41
	2. United States Negotiation Difficulties -	47
	3. Spanish Negotiation Difficulties -----	50
	4. The Agreement is Signed -----	55
IV.	SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY -----	64
	A. SPAIN -- A EUROPEAN NATION -----	67
	B. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES -----	85
	C. NATO AND THE SPANISH MILITARY -----	89
	D. PORTUGAL -----	92
	E. OIL AND THE ARAB WORLD -----	94
	F. COLONIAL POSSESSIONS -----	97

V.	CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE U.S.-SPANISH AGREEMENTS -----	103
A.	PERCEIVED SPANISH NATIONAL GOALS -----	104
1.	Prosperity -----	107
2.	Equality and Respect -----	114
3.	Internal Stability -----	116
4.	Security Commitment -----	117
5.	Support on Gibraltar and Sahara -----	119
B.	U.S. POSITION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ----	120
C.	RECENT EVENTS -----	123
1.	Soviet Influence -----	123
2.	Present Negotiations -----	124
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	128
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	133

I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1953, the United States has invested a significant amount of time and resources in the building and maintaining of military facilities on Spanish soil. The three air bases at Torregón, Zaragoza, and Morón, and the naval base at Rota are important elements of the defense structure of the United States and the Western alliance. Under bilateral agreements, these facilities belong to Spain; the United States leases them for mutually agreed upon purposes.

The period from 1953 to the present has brought numerous changes in the foreign policies of the two nations. The United States desires to continue its use of Spanish military facilities even though American policies and objectives have changed over the years. The United States has adapted the usage of the bases, within the limits of the agreements, to fit the present conditions in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Spain, on the other hand, has been greatly affected by its European, Mediterranean, and African neighbors. The poles of Spanish foreign policy have evolved new relative strengths as world events dictate new policies. The most powerful, the integrative force of Europe, has shown a slow, continual increase since 1945. The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate this trend toward European integration, and then determine how it will affect the U.S. military presence in Spain.

Through the use of traditional historiographic research and forecasting techniques, conclusions and most probable courses of action will be arrived at relative to the Spanish variables affecting foreign policy decisions. The research is presented in a general context so as to allow unclassified evaluations and conclusions.

The scope of the research will be confined to the major events from the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to the 1975 base rights negotiations; the reasons why the U.S. changed foreign policies in 1953; the evolution of Spanish foreign policy and how it relates to U.S. objectives; and finally the forecast of future possibilities for future U.S. - Spanish agreements on the base rights issue.

In addition to the political science courses which are part of the Naval Intelligence Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, and the survey of the literature pertaining to Spanish-American relations, the author visited Washington D.C. and Madrid, Spain for a two week period in order to observe the international decision making process as well as to become aware of recent events. The author benefited greatly from the advice and opinions of the following individuals who took time for interviews, telephone conversations, and correspondence: Mr. Larry Pezzullo, Assistant to the Ambassador at Large, Robert McCloskey, Department of State; Mr. Michael Durkey, Spanish Desk, Department of State; Mr. David Simcox, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Madrid, Spain;

Col. R.A. Bowen, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Pentagon; Cdr R. Rager, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Military-Political Affairs OP-614 , Pentagon; and VADM Juan Carlos Muñoz-Delgado, Spanish Navy, and BG Constantino Ortin, Spanish Army, at the Naval Systems Management Center, Monterey Ca.

The views expressed herein are only those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. Navy or the Naval Postgraduate School.

II. HISTORY OF SPANISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The period 1945-1953 brought radical changes to American foreign policy toward Spain. In 1945 the United States and its Allies had just won the most costly war ever waged. The totalitarian governments of the Axis powers had been defeated and the U.S. had adopted its traditional stance against dictatorships. By 1950, however, the United States had thrown its support to General Franco's dictatorship in Spain. Why? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine Spanish-American relations beginning with the Spanish Civil War. This war was a milestone in the modern history of Spain. It brought the present Spanish government into power and set the stage for American foreign policy toward Spain until after World War II.

A. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Modern Spanish-American relations began with the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. The Republican government of Primo de Rivera from 1931-1936 was weak and unable to satisfy the desires of the landowner, businessmen, clergy, and generals, or the needs of the workers and peasants. The Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary wing of the General union of Workers (UGT) Largo Caballero led the laborers in their demands for higher wages, education, land to till, better living conditions, and the right to organize and to strike. Their discontent unlocked the door of revolution which caused the rebellious

General union of Officers (UME) under the leadership of General Francisco Franco to revolt. His forces were known as the Insurgents or Nationalists.

This internal war between Nationalists and Republicans, also called loyalists, was a war of brother against brother. It moved from village to city and throughout the entire country. There was much bloodshed with atrocities committed by both sides as women, children, priests, nuns, and others were murdered until horror became a daily part of life. The economy of Spain was completely destroyed as each side used all resources available. Had the war been more swift so as to have not depleted the nation's wealth, the warring sides may not have found it necessary to seek foreign aid and involvement. But as it resulted, the Nationalists were required to accept aid from the Fascist governments of Italy and Germany because other powers either found it politically advantageous to remain neutral or were confident that support of the Republican force was the safest policy.

The Soviet Union provided the Loyalists with some aid; there was more interest in assisting the workers to establish a sympathetic government. In an effort to safeguard the Spanish gold reserve, Soviet officials convinced the Spanish Minister of Finance, Doctor Negrin, to transfer 510,079,592 grams of gold from the Spanish treasury to Moscow. It arrived the 6th of November 1936 and has not been heard of since. [21 p. 516] Because this sizeable resource would have been of

great value to the victor of the Civil War in re-establishing an economy, the Soviet's continued denial of its existence has always been an alienating force.

The United States at this time was pursuing a policy of isolation and did not support or provide aid to either side. Toward the end of the Civil War, a public opinion poll taken in the United States revealed that 76% favored the Republican cause. [5 p. 10] This fact is important and should be kept in mind as it had a profound influence on Americans until 1953.

The Nationalist force relied on German and Italian aid, equipment, and personnel in their effort to overthrow the existing government. Both of these donors saw Spain as a potential ally as they assembled their power and assets. Just as the Soviet Communists attempted to infiltrate the war torn Spanish government through the labor movement, the Germans and Italians used the military structure in preparation for future campaigns of greater import. General Franco's forces prevailed and put a stop to the fighting. As the Spanish Civil War was drawing to a close in 1939, World War II was in its infancy stage and General Franco was indebted to the Axis powers. His accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact on March 26, 1939, formalized Spain's debt. This was not a military alliance, but it did commit Spain to political cooperation with Germany, Italy, and Japan. Spain was an active member under this pact until 1942. [66 p. 5]

The Spanish Civil War forced each nation of Europe to take sides even if their official foreign policy was neutralism. The war received a great amount of publicity especially concerning the brutality and savage nature of the contestants. Each reported event prompted reactions from religious organizations, political parties, national governments, ethnic communities, businessmen, and individual leaders. The correct choice of the noblest cause was extremely difficult. One of the most important factors influencing this choice was Spain's association with the Axis powers. There was no time to judge the new Franco government on its own merits; the nations of Europe were more worried about their own safety. General Franco was hastily evaluated by using the friends he solicited as well as the means by which he and his followers came to power. Therefore, to sympathize with Franco and his Nationalist cause was interpreted to be approval of Hitler and his goals. General Franco was prejudged, as World War II began, to be a fascist dictator who would surely follow in Hitler's footsteps. This would plague Franco throughout his reign as the ruler of Spain.

B. WORLD WAR II

During the period following the Spanish Civil War, Franco was very careful not to enter any bilateral type of military alliance because of the inability of Spain to support any such commitment. In light of the conflict that was certain

to break out in Europe in 1939, Franco brought Spain into the Pact of Friendship with Germany, thereby assuring non-aggression in return for Spain's neutrality. The agreement was supplemented by secret pacts that gave Germany the use of naval facilities in Spanish ports and a "cooperative" role in relation to the Spanish police, press and propaganda. [66 p. 5]

At the same time Franco conducted a personal campaign against United States democracy as well as Soviet Union communism. Since neither of these countries aided his cause, he had no intention of aiding theirs, especially since he believed that the Axis powers were the strongest. His propaganda attacks were carried out mainly through his influence in the Latin American countries which were becoming very concerned about the degree of growth of American influence and control in the individual countries. This friendship with Latin America would prove to be useful again when Spain later needed economic aid.

As World War II began to expand, General Franco was decidedly pro-Axis; however, he was actually trying to balance between both warring factions.

Until November 1942, so long as the tide of victory ran in favor of the Axis, Spain played her chosen role of pro-Axis neutral throughout, though with varying degrees of vigor and in constant readiness to jump into the fray as soon as it was as good as won. What deterred her from entering sooner was not only her own weakness and the danger of retaliation to which this and her geographic situation exposed her, but also her dependence on anti-Axis powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, for essential imports such as petroleum, cotton, and foodstuffs. [66 p. 6-7]

On June 14, 1940, when France was about to fall, Spain informed Germany that she was ready to assist the Axis war effort, but for a price. This price was the imperialistic desire of Spain to control Gibraltar, French Morocco, a slice of Algeria, and parts of the coast of Africa south of Morocco. At this time Spain was evaluated to have an army of 340,000 men who were in need of officers and ammunition, but otherwise ready and capable of waging a limited war of short duration. Franco made this offer because of his optimistic opinion that the end of the war was in sight. [66 p. 8]

Hitler and Franco met in October of 1940 to discuss Spain's participation in the war. Franco was promised only Gibraltar; the other areas were left undiscussed. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini were willing to pay the price Franco demanded. Therefore, he cancelled all agreements. He stated bluntly that if he was to be denied his aspiration for Spanish expansion, then Germany could not use Spain as a front for an attack on Gibraltar in order to control the straits.

Later, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Franco was delighted. Certainly now the war was almost over and the Axis powers would be the victors. General Franco again saw this as an excellent time, if not the last time, to enter the war to reap some of the spoils. It was also a good time to have some vengeance on the Soviet Union for its refusal to return the Spanish gold deposited during the Civil War.

In July, 1941, Franco sent his Blue Legion of 14,000 volunteers to fight in the Leningrad front. [55 p. 10] He also supplied a large Spanish labor force to Germany, consisting of both skilled and unskilled workers. [21 p. 577] This entire symbolic effort was in vain. In addition to the loss of all but 8,000 men of the Blue Legion, the tide of the war was beginning to turn. The Allied forces were preparing to invade North Africa. Spain was becoming surrounded by the Allied naval forces. General Franco began to reconsider his position in the war and to instigate reversals of his prior policies. "Henceforth his energies were to be devoted almost impartially to working both sides of the street while keeping Spain untouched by war." [66 p. 12-13]

Prior to the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942, President Roosevelt sent two persuasive letters to General Franco emphasizing the fact that none of the actions of the United States were against Spain or its areas of influence and were not to be interpreted as such. He even attempted to apologize for the recent denunciations of the Franco regime by the American press. In short, President Roosevelt was trying to keep Spain from any further participation in the war and to preserve her neutrality for the best interest of the Allied forces. Spain would not have a great affect on the war even if total involvement occurred because of her limited resources, but her entry would extend the length of the European Campaign. Friendship was indicated in the form

of the salutation and the signature of the letter. These communications were very clear illustrations of giving military considerations priority over political factors. This prefigured the position that was to be taken a decade later when the agreement for base rights was concluded with Spain. The only differences would be that the war would be cold, not hot, and Franco's active cooperation would be sought, not his neutrality. [66 p. 12-13]

This is an appropriate point to summarize the world opinion of Spain. The following Post World War II section presents the actions taken by the United Nations to isolate Spain and the three factors which persuaded most of the developed nations to reject Franco and his government. The American mood was in keeping with this anti-Spain position.

C. POST WORLD WAR II

After the Allied victory in Europe, American as well as world public opinion was very anti-Spain. General Franco had tried to walk the narrow fence dividing the warring factions during the latter part of the war, but had stepped off occasionally violating his own neutrality. For his early pro-Hitler position and his later failure to decidedly take the Allied side, the Allies were not about to forgive him even though there was sympathy with the oppressed Spanish population. World opinion was made formal on December 12, 1946, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the resolution which barred Spain from entry into the

organization on the grounds that its dictatorship form of government was not peace loving. The resolution also called for all the members to recall their ambassadors from Madrid. Ironically, this motion was introduced by Poland which was not considered to be an ideal example of a democratic form of government. The United States and Great Britain were dragged into the support of the resolution, but this was in keeping with the sentiment of their general populations. The United States conveniently complied with the resolution by a previous unplanned event; the American Ambassador to Spain, Mr. Norman Armour, resigned on November 11, 1945. [21 p. 598] No successor was appointed until December 27, 1950 when President Truman sent Stanton Griffis as the American Ambassador to Spain. James C. Dunn later replaced Griffis in 1953 when the newly elected President Eisenhower took office.

American public opinion of Franco's Spain during this post World War II period is of significant importance since it set the stage for an understanding of the dilemma faced by American decision makers as the new threats of the fifties approached. Three general themes characterized this opinion of Franco.

The first and most important cause of anti-Franco sentiment which is still very important is the simple fact that he is a dictator. The word and all it stands for is unacceptable to Americans. This fear and dislike of centralized authority goes all the way back in American

history to the early Republic. General Franco established a dictatorship at the end of the Civil War and appeared to have no intention of forsaking autocracy for democracy. Individual rights and freedom had been sacrificed, but the Spanish people in general were satisfied to have peace and order restored. They believed that Franco was good for Spain but not so in the eyes of Americans who had their vision blurred by the ugly word "dictator."

The second factor was the means by which Franco came to power. He had incurred a debt to Germany and Italy which Americans assumed would be very binding and illustrative of future support. In addition Franco had defeated a Loyalist force with which a significant number of Americans were sympathetic. Therefore, Americans disliked and distrusted Franco because of how he had acquired his control over Spain.

The third influence on American opinion was Franco's "fence walking" in World War II. His desire to keep the war out of the already devastated Spain that was licking its Civil War wounds as well as to be in a favorable position with the victors was not an acceptable excuse for his lack of total support for the Allied cause. This reason for dislike of Franco is still present today. Franco is a reminder of the suffering and destruction of World War II. Isolation was to be Spain's punishment for Franco's decisions: he was to be a symbol of the dictatorships of the World War II era.

As the political scientist Gabriel Almond pointed out "The orientation of most Americans toward foreign policy is one of mood, and mood is essentially an unstable phenomenon." [2 p. 408] This mood can be predicted by observing the character tendencies of the population and by evaluating the presence or absence of a threat in the internal or external political-economic situation. The mood of the American people following World War II was characterized by international security and concern for internal problems. Spain certainly was not a topic of conversation and was hardly considered important to the powerful United States. However, in 1948, the Berlin crisis and the perceived threat of communism would illustrate just how unstable the mood of America could be and how rapidly foreign policy toward Spain could change.

III. SPANISH-AMERICAN BASE AGREEMENTS

The national interests of any nation must be continually reviewed. So it was in the 1950's, that as the United States sought national security, all actions abroad were intended to assist in securing these goals. Timely action necessary to insure that our position as a nation is properly maintained required policy reversals. The Cold War with the Soviet Union placed new importance on the value of the Iberian Peninsula. It had become a strategic location from which the United States could defend its national interests.

In order to preserve its values, institutions, and security against possible Soviet penetration, the United States became involved in blending nations, political groups, cultures, and religions of all kinds. The severity of the threat forced America to choose a route counter to its moralistic judgment and the opinion of Europe as it eased into a mutual relationship with Spain.

The reasons why the United States entered into the bilateral agreement with Spain in 1953 known as the Pact of Madrid provide a reference point from which present relations may be examined. The mood of America changed during the late 1940's as the perceived threat of communism became more ominous. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine this mood and its effects in order to understand why there was an American foreign policy reversal toward Spain.

A. PACT OF MADRID 1953

1. United States Policy Change

In the post World War II period from 1947 to 1953, the mood of most Americans toward foreign policy assumed its changeable character. Americans traditionally view international politics with indifference and withdrawal. Their personal goals and interests usually take priority. Indeed, this was the case immediately following the war. The primacy of private and domestic values was reasserted. Gabriel Almond stated that, "The pull of 'privatism' in America creates a strong inclination to self-deception...". [2 p. 409] This was the controlling force behind the demobilization of the military establishment as well as some of the wartime civilian bureaucracy. This overreaction of the American mood was in itself very dangerous to the sense of national security that existed during this temporary stabilization of a world crisis. This was an excellent time for communism under the vanguard of the Soviet Union to also make a temporary tactical withdrawal to feed the deception of the American mood.

The political apathy of the population in the United States immediately after the war was probably a direct result of the concentration of energy on private competition. Certainly the basic understanding of political policy was not beyond the capability of the general population, it even may have been less complicated than day to day business affairs. There was, however, very little incentive to be interested

in foreign affairs unless the business of the individual happened to be directly related to the foreign policy of the United States toward a particular country. There was a strong cultural incentive to develop policies and strategies relating to personal business and professional careers.

However, in 1947 both the American people and the government began to realize that Russia was going to be a future major foreign policy concern. Britain was in severe economic condition and was unable to support a major presence in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the United States could not pursue complacency and isolation; new responsibilities had to be assumed. Public opinion was brought to bear on the previously disregarded facts. Russia was still a dictatorship, a police regime which feared and repressed all internal opposition. Aggressive foreign policy decisions such as the Marshall Plan and the Truman Plan began to draw strong public support.

The communist offensive began shortly after the end of the war. The Berlin crisis followed by the Soviet development of the atomic bomb and the Korean conflict of 1950 convinced the United States and the rest of the West that more than just a political threat was present. The explosive nature of American public opinion would respond to this threat to equilibrium and stability with anger and concern for security.

Gabriel Almond noted that "a foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response." [2 p. 408] When there is a period of political equilibrium, American attitudes toward foreign policy tend to be vague and formless. During a crisis, this attitude becomes more specific. The threat is oversimplified as are the methods for coping with it. This characteristic response during World War II reduced foreign policy considerations to 'unconditional surrender' and 'win the war'. The early 1950's, however, brought a threat that could not be simplified. Since the complex threat of communism could not be simplified, the American attitude could not be changed from its vague structureless base. The reverse thought process questioned that if the threat could not be dealt with using a simple method then the threat was too complicated and not worthy of consideration. The population was too busy with private affairs to be concerned with the complexity of communism. They expected that the government would handle the situation.

A complex problem may cause public opinion to produce one of two adverse effects. There may be a withdrawal from the problem if previous solutions have failed. For example, at the end of World War II, the administration believed that the communism problem could be dealt with best by good will and the "man to man" approach. "The continued thwarting

of American overtures and concessions to the Russians now seems to have produced an attitude of hopeless pessimism."

[2 p. 411] This caused an overall negative attitude toward further negotiations and a withdrawal from further efforts to bargain with the Russians. There is also the possibility of hasty reactions motivated by irritation and impatience.
[2 p. 412]

The national security of the United States, as well as the rest of the non-communist world, was being directly threatened. Isolation was no longer the foreign policy of the United States; new strategic policies now called for rearmament and expansion of strategic military bases to counter any new communist efforts.

The American public was no longer apathetic toward foreign affairs. The memory of Pearl Harbor impelled Americans to demand that protective measures be taken and that national security policies be reviewed. The new concept of nuclear deterrence was born; large conventional forces could be reduced by the use of a credible nuclear delivery system that would prevent an attack by the opposing force. The question now was how to deploy such a system and would it in fact counter the threat.

In light of the new communist threat and the residual dislike of General Franco, it hardly seemed likely that the United States would find Spain to be of any value. However, military advisors were very eager to voice their opinions as to the benefits that Spain could provide to the security of

the United States. These opinions were presented in the form of a paper submitted by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, to the Secretary of State.

Spain is ideally situated to control the Mediterranean Sea and provide a stepping stone to Europe. The Iberian peninsula is surrounded by water on all sides except the connection to Europe which is protected by the Pyrenees Mountains.

Within her territory Spain has more than enough practicable sites for airfields, and plenty of manpower for putting them into shape. She has good harbors both on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for bringing in essential supplies to troops. Weather conditions for use of her airfields, too, are better on the average than in most countries. [4 p. 350]

The airfields in Spain would not be any closer to the Soviet Union than those in North Africa for purposes of bombing missions, but they would be advantageous for tactical support of military forces in the Mediterranean area. The acquisition of bases in Spain would add another link to the global security network that the United States was building. They would provide an excellent location to replenish the Sixth Fleet as well as control the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.

The conclusion was reached that Spain was valuable to the United States mainly because of its geographic location. At this time the Spanish military was not considered to be important or relevant to the value decision concerning Spain. The Spanish military, which forms the

backbone of the Franco regime, was almost too large for the country to support. Men were needed in agriculture and industry to save the economy. Although the Spanish Army had antiquated weapons and equipment, they were well organized and trained in the use of the resources available to them; but they were hardly a viable force if faced with a modern mechanized enemy. Ports, airfields, roads, railroads, and communication channels were in an unsatisfactory state. Excessive reconstruction would be necessary to make Spain a valuable asset for general purpose warfare. This would include a complete modernization of the armed forces with new equipment and associated training. As it resulted, this modernization was part of the price Franco later placed on the establishment of American bases in Spain.

The United States military, in particular the Air Force and the Navy, began to use their persuasive efforts to illustrate the necessity for bases in Spain. This professional analysis of the strategic value of Spain influenced Congress to begin considering this country as an asset to the defense of the West. The recommendations presented by the military, however, did not include provisions for the means to accomplish this goal. They were interested in Spain only as a valuable strategic location for airfields and a naval base, which could serve as a replenishment site for the Mediterranean Fleet. Cost was also excluded from their considerations since the severity of the threat would support the probable massive expenditure necessary for the

complete modernization of existing Spanish military installations. The value of the end would justify the cost. In effect, the perceived necessity for bases in Spain fostered a major foreign policy reversal by the United States. In 1950 the United States was also attempting to consolidate the North Atlantic community against Soviet communist expansion. Spain belonged to this community because of its geographic position, its history, and its strong anti-communist orientation. The dictatorship form of government, however, was still an area of disagreement and displeasure among the other community members. The United States was forced to deal with Spain bilaterally. The Europeans had not forgotten nor forgiven Franco.

2. Spanish Foreign Policy Change

Circumstances also persuaded Spain to change its foreign policy. The cumulative effects of imposed European and self isolation, bad weather, and poverty made it very difficult for Franco to build a new Spain. The United States was helping to rebuild Europe while at the same time trying to contain communism. Since Franco realized that Spain could not make it on its own, he began to seek American aid; in return he was willing to allow the United States to construct military facilities on Spanish soil.

General Franco's political strategy is as simple as a spear. Every action of his aims at only one achievement: to stay on. Under the most varied and even contradictory tactical appearances – peace, neutrality, warmongery, amnesty, persecution, monarchy, regency – General Franco has one and only one thought: General Franco. [21 p. 593]

This personal dictatorship has greatly affected the political, economic, and military development of Spain. His foreign policy has been in conflict with the Communist Bloc as well as the Western Allies.

In 1947 Franco was now politically secure within Spain, but he continued to be beset with difficulties in the world beyond. For the most part they were economic. [51 p. 206] The Civil War and World War II left Spain in poverty which intensified every year. Not only were most goods in short supply, but the means of distribution were in very poor condition. The black market was growing, as was the cost of living. Corruption was even considered to be a necessary evil.

Unseasonably bad weather in 1945 critically affected agriculture as well as power production as a result of a severe drought. In addition to these natural calamities, Spain had to contend with its unfriendly relations with numerous nations. In particular, France closed its border in March of 1946 for two years. Britain and the United States made it clear that no sympathy would be shown toward Spain. Spain was now suffering because of the fluctuating manner in which Franco dictated foreign policy. [51 p. 207]

General Franco was thought of by his population to be either a hero or a necessary evil. He had brought the nation out of the Civil War and had maintained stability; he was the only alternative to anarchy. Many factions wanted Franco to step down and have a monarch reinstalled, but this included the unanswered question of who would be king. Most of the Spanish population had vivid memories of the chaos of the Civil War and had no desire to have it happen again.

Franco gained the support of the people even as the foreign propaganda was directed toward Spain. He used this onslaught of world opinion to his advantage to arouse national support of his firm international policy (firm in the sense that it was stable until he changed his mind). The pride of the Spanish people and their resentment of foreigners were the embers he fanned. After the United Nations had made its judgment of Franco, Spain withdrew into itself. The external attacks were a benefit to Franco's internal politics. [51 p. 203-204]

Spain was befriended by a few nations. The good relation with Argentina was very important during the problem period immediately following World War II. She provided Spain with a source of badly needed wheat. Argentina also provided moral support to Spain in her solitary stance against the unfriendliness of the major powers. However, the poverty situation in Spain delayed repayment of the extensive credit agreements; an imbalance of trade continued

to grow mainly due to the lack of industrial capacity in Spain to produce manufactured goods that Argentina desired. Because of rising internal problems, Argentina was forced to discontinue financial aid to Spain in 1949.

Franco now turned to the United States to provide a foundation for economic growth in Spain. He carefully began a lobby effort to gain support for his cause. Economics had forced Franco to reverse his previous foreign policy. Also, in 1948 the events of the world had created a climate advantageous to Franco's goals; the Soviet Union was now a common opponent of both the United States and Spain. [51 p. 208-210]

In approaching the United States on matters of aid, General Franco also had to keep in mind the fact that European opinion had an influence on American policy. Although Franco had been strongly opposed to communism since the beginning of his administration, this position did not help his relations with Britain and France. These relations were already strained by Franco's territorial aspirations. Because of this alienation by both the East and the West, Spain was excluded from the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Recovery Program.

Resentment in Europe led to the feeling that the character and record of the Spanish regime, despite its staunch anti-Communist attitude, could not be reconciled with the general purposes for which the members of the North Atlantic Treaty had united. The presence of Spain, it felt, would merely prove a source of embarrassment and a weakness in the ideological struggle with Soviet communism. [17 p. 228]

Neither Britain nor France were willing to contribute to the modernization of the Spanish economy or to develop a useful anti-communist military force since Franco might use this aid to further his territorial ambitions.

Therefore, the United States was the only power with whom Franco felt that there was any chance of successful bargaining. He was now very willing to allow American bases to be constructed on Spanish soil as long as he received the economic aid needed and possibly the commitment of United States forces to the defense of Spain.

3. Spain and United States Agree

The Eisenhower administration met the threats of communism head on. The nuclear strength of the United States was very important to the balance of world power within the concept of deterrence. Overseas facilities were needed to place the Soviet Union within striking distance as well as for the defense of Europe. The United States was, therefore, anxious to conclude the agreement with Spain. In addition to the military provisions of the agreement, there was also a significant amount of United States aid involved. The two nations were satisfied, but of course there were some remaining adverse opinions on both sides.

In 1953 National Security Council memorandum No. 162 (NSC 162) which was started during the Truman administration presented the "new look" of the Eisenhower administration. The Soviet possession of the atomic bomb and the loss of China to communism emphasized the requirement that the United States must be prepared to meet a powerful threat. Domestic factors also contributed to the formulation of NSC 162. The administration was under pressure to reduce expenditures and taxes, and to balance the budget. This presented the problem of how to increase military defenses and yet reduce the budget and maintain economic stability.

NSC 162 assumed that at this time the United States and the Soviet Union were in parity because the United States had a credible nuclear weapon delivery system and the Soviet Union had a large general purpose force. Therefore, the United States concluded that it was more economical to rely on its nuclear deterrent than try to maintain a large counter general purpose force. This view was extended to include the return of soldiers from Korea and Europe to form a large reserve force which was similar to the previous mobilization theory. NSC 162 also contained four other assumptions: (1) There would be no significant increase in the international tension level; (2) There would be no significant change in the ratio of U.S. and U.S.S.R. power; (3) Massive nuclear retaliation would be

the deterrent to massive or limited war; (4) Nuclear weapons would be used in any war.

During this period of the Cold War, the United States was at its high water mark of power. This meant that any move by the Soviet Union toward Western Europe would require a nuclear response since this was the only immediate force available. To make this position very clear, the United States openly solicited the use of air bases in Spain to station strategic bombers. This was only one of the reasons for the American desire to have military bases in Spain, but it was the most dramatic.

The Pact of Madrid was signed in Madrid, Spain on September 26, 1953 by Don Alberto Martin Artajo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, and by James C. Dunn, the United States Ambassador to Spain at this time. It was the result of negotiations which were initiated by exploratory conversations by Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Francisco Franco on July 16, 1951. The preamble of the agreement stresses the threat of communism and how Spain and the United States are working to preserve peace.

PREAMBLE

Faced with the danger that threatens the western world, the Governments of the United States and Spain, desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security through foresighted measures which will increase their capability and that of the other nations which dedicate their efforts to the same high purposes to participate effectively in agreements for self defense. [55 p. 435-436]

The Pact of Madrid was an executive agreement between the President of the United States and General Franco. Since it was not a treaty, there was no necessity to have it ratified by the Senate. The executive agreement power first became important during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Both Congress and the federal judiciary approved the use of this less formal type of agreement mainly in the establishment of aid and assistance programs. The type of international agreement to be used is now the prerogative of the President. If the agreement is to be very formal and is very unlikely of receiving censorship in the Senate, it will probably be submitted as a treaty. But as in most situations, the easiest course of action for the Executive Department is to use the executive agreement format thereby by-passing the ratification process.

The bilateral agreement with Spain was designed "... to strengthen the capabilities of the West for the maintenance of international peace and security." [55 p. 435-436] The Pact consisted of three mutually beneficial interdependent agreements. The central document is the Defense Agreement.

It authorized the development, maintenance, and utilization of certain unspecified bases by the United States, jointly with the Spanish government. It stipulates that the bases shall remain under the 'sovereign' and the 'flag and command' of Spain and that 'the time and manner of (their) war time utilization ... will be as mutually agreed upon.' It authorized the United States to station in Spain the necessary supplies and equipment, operate the necessary facilities, and exercise the necessary supervision over personnel, facilities, and

equipment. Finally it provided that the agreement should remain in force 'for a period of ten years, automatically extended for two successive periods of five years each,' unless terminated according to a specified procedure. [66 p. 45]

Under the provisions of the Military Security Act Agreement, Spain was to receive a total of \$226 million during the fiscal year 1954. This amount was divided into \$85 million for defense-support assistance and \$141 million for military end-item assistance. Over half of the total aid to be given was a carry over of money already appropriated for economic aid to Spain in 1951 and 1952. These appropriations were obtained by the Spanish lobby; the actual aid was never allocated. This \$125 million was divided into two categories. The first was \$50 million for military equipment. The remaining \$75 million was more economy oriented in so far as it was to finance Spanish imports of raw materials and equipment, and to provide technical assistance to effectively implement modern economic techniques. Congress appropriated the remaining \$101 million in 1954; this was also divided into military equipment purchase for \$91 million and \$10 million for defense support assistance. [55 p. 435-436]

The Pact of Madrid met with strong opposition in Spain. There was a fear that Spain would become a satellite of American influence. For this reason the agreement contained strict rules for the conduct of American personnel stationed in Spain. This was done to prevent anti-American incidents. The Spanish people generally disliked the

'ugly American' who had more money than manners and indeed little respect for the old civilizations of Europe. Also the American was thought of as being Protestant. The Spanish people felt that their Catholic values were endangered by the American religious precepts which were painted with money. The powerful position of the Catholic Church of Spain fashioned the entire population both spiritually and politically. In return for this privileged position, Franco was given the Church's total support. [51 p. 219]

The American population was also opposed to the agreement because of the adverse public opinion of Franco's form of government, historical associations, and anti-democratic outbursts. The people were not ready to legitimize the State's decision which ran counter to their morality in the cultural context. The United States was still faced with the dilemma of a decision involving the fear of communism versus the morality of the population.

Spanish-American relations from 1953 to 1968 were stable. The provisions of the Pact of Madrid were instituted and honored by both sides. The bases were built; military and economic aid began to bring prosperity to Spain.

4. The Period from 1953-1968

The basic program of the 1953 agreement was to be completed by June 1958. On September 23, 1956 the air base at Torrejón became the first United States facility to be opened. The pivot point of the entire program was the naval base at Rota. This was to be the headquarters of the

Sixth Fleet. This installation was expected to cost over \$120 million, of the total \$400 million allotted for base construction. (See Figure 1 for the location of the bases at Torrejón, Zaragoza, Morón, and Rota.)

As the program developed and the bases were being built, relations between Spain and the United States were very good with the exception of a few occasions when American officials gave the impression that the United States had unlimited rights concerning the usage of the bases. Spain made it very clear that it had the right to control how the bases were to be used.

The 1963 renewal of the base rights agreement was important to the United States because it was hoped that nuclear powered submarines equipped with Polaris missiles could be based at the naval base at Rota. After hard bargaining, a five year renewal was signed, the United States contracted to furnish more dollar assistance and military aid. Shortly after the renewal, the Pentagon decided upon gradual withdrawal from strategic bomber bases in Spain, while holding on to the key Rota facility for use by a nuclear submarine squadron. The bombers had served their purpose; now air and logistic support would be the major air force missions in Spain.

Since the 1953-1968 period was stable concerning Spanish-American relations, it is appropriate to move on to the important 1968-1970 negotiation period. The national issues must be reexamined in order to understand how the



Figure 1

1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States and Spain came into being, and how these same issues may affect subsequent negotiations.

B. THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, 1970

The bilateral agreement signed by the United States and Spain on September 26, 1953, began a new era of cooperation between the two nations. The United States, seeking national security while in a cold war with communism, and Spain, seeking world recognition and aid in order to build for the future, sought one another to bargain with their resources to best meet their individual needs. Two very dissimilar governments, a democracy and a dictatorship, made a bilateral agreement which has continued in general meaning for twenty years.

The original Defense Agreement contained the provision that it would remain in effect for ten years, after which it could be renewed twice for periods of five years each. In 1963 the first renewal became effective within the time period allotted for negotiations. However, in 1968 the renewal did not operate with the previous efficiency. Twice the two nations agreed to extend the joint operation of the air and naval bases for one year following the expiration of the agreement in September 1968. The last extension was to expire on September 26, 1970. [27 May 15, 1970, 15:1] Both nations felt that time was not as critical as it was for the 1953 agreement; the United States was not

frantically trying to defend itself and Spain was not in any economic crisis. However, each nation still had assets and resources for which it was worth bargaining. Spain considered that its position was the controlling factor; the United States must simply pay the price. The goals were set high and allowance for compromise was small. There was time to be careful in seeking the maximum return for the required investment.

Negotiations were delayed because of two key issues:

(1) Spain wanted a defense treaty with a commitment of United States forces. (2) Spain wanted \$1 billion in aid and military assistance. The United States was only interested in maintaining the right to jointly use Spanish military facilities. Therefore, the essential point to be negotiated was how much it was going to cost the United States to use these facilities for five more years.

1. United States Need for Bases in Spain 1970

The United States no longer needed Spanish bases for stationing bombers near the Soviet Union; but the bases were still required for other reasons. Mr. George W. Landau from the Department of State stated that "We need our bases and military facilities in Spain, since these are essential to the projection of U.S. power and ultimately the credibility of our deterrent capability in the Mediterranean."

[53 p. 218] For example the bases were used during the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the Congo air lift in 1961, and the evacuation of United States personnel during the 1967 Middle

East crisis. Mr. Landau went on to summarize the function of the American bases by stating, "... all of our facilities in Spain are defensive and deterrent in nature and will contribute to maintenance of peace and avoidance of conflict." [53 p. 249] The very nature of this function makes it easy for opponents to believe that these facilities are not really necessary and definitely not worth the rental fee because there is seemingly no visible threat to American security; the United States would appear to be overprotective at the tax payers' expense. But it must be noted that our strategic posture in light of other base closures had been reduced already. The essential role of Spanish bases continued to grow in significance as Soviet presence in the Mediterranean steadily increased.

The United States had approximately 8000 military personnel and 13,000 dependents stationed in Spain at four bases: Rota, Torrejón, Zaragoza, and Morón. [42 p. 175]

The naval base at Rota supported a squadron of Polaris submarines as well as many of the ships of the Sixth Fleet on an irregular basis. It served as a base for naval reconnaissance aircraft. There was also a small naval communication facility located at the naval base.

The air base at Torrejón near Madrid was the home base for a wing of F-4 aircraft, detachments of which were deployed forward to Italy and Turkey. It was also a European military replenishment site and base for tanker aircraft.

The closing of the Air Force Base at Wheelus Field in Libya, required that the base at Zaragoza in north eastern Spain be reactivated. The training range at the near by Barbenas Reales was now essential to the readiness of our European based air forces in Germany, England, Turkey, and Italy. The fair weather of Zaragoza made it possible to conduct continuous pilot training. No other air base in Europe had this potential. The training conducted here was in strict accordance with the bilateral agreement; but naturally since the United States Air Force was a major contributor to NATO strength, the overall readiness of this alliance was benefited by the use of this training facility. [53 p. 219-220]

Since 1970, Moron Air Base near Rota in south western Spain has been officially in a standby status. Five hundred personnel are still assigned to the facility to maintain its condition. [42 p. 175]

In fiscal 1970 the operating costs of American-used facilities in Spain was \$90 million. This includes the costs related to the support of the 55 personnel in the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). [42 p. 175]

Spain in return received an estimated \$35 to \$38 million income from the American presence. This was in addition to the aid provided as stipulated in the base agreement. The income had an economic impact mainly on the immediate surrounding area of each base. It was not a vital source of income for the nation which had an estimated 25 million

tourists annually. [53 p. 226] This associated income, therefore, was a bargaining factor for the United States only in the context of the economic welfare of the community in proximity to the American used facilities.

Negotiations began in 1968 to renew the old agreement, but efforts were soon altered by the consideration of an entirely new agreement and possibly a treaty. Spain continually stressed that she was exposing herself to attack by granting the United States the use of Spanish facilities. In return for Spanish cooperation, the United States continued to refuse to make any defense commitment to guarantee the security of the host nation. In fact, Washington attempted to pass this responsibility on to NATO by reviving European interest in granting Spanish admission. This proposal was soundly overruled at the NATO conference in Rome in May 1970, by the Northern European countries. They kept their traditional position that democracy in Spain was required before admission. [27 May 28, 1970, 12:1]

Spain is party to only one actual mutual defense agreement. Portugal and Spain signed the Iberian Pact in 1942. Spain has a military agreement with France which was signed in June 1970, but it does not cover mutual defense. [53 p. 235]

The principal difficulty facing a new agreement on the American usage of Spanish facilities was the reluctance of the United States to give even a vaguely worded security

commitment. Spain was forced to abandon any hope for a mutual defense treaty because of the adverse effect that the Vietnam War had on American willingness to make any overseas commitments. Spain, therefore, had to try instead to attain a less formal type of commitment, which most probably would mean another executive agreement similar in form to the original Pact of Madrid.

The previous 1963 agreement contained a declaration that an attack on either country would be a matter of "common concern." Even this was too binding as interpreted by Congress that was very concerned with popular opinion in regards to commitments abroad. [27 May 28, 1970, 12:1] In 1970 the United States was still involved in the vague commitment controversy concerning the American position in Indochina. The legality and constitutionality of the commitment was being subjected to long and bitter debates. In spite of this lesson in international relations, the Nixon administration, apart from Congressional participation, proceeded with another vague agreement with Spain [27 July 28, 1970, 30:1]

Spain's other tactic was to press for aid and assistance both military and non-military commensurate with risks of attack involved. The military aid would be used to modernize Spanish forces so as to enable them to be able to defend themselves. Spain originally suggested a list of equipment whose value was estimated at over a billion

dollars. This was considered excessive by the United States. The expected total value of military aid to be offered to Spain was \$100 to \$125 million. [27 May 28, 1970, 12:1]

Spain expected to get either a specific commitment or a vague commitment augmented by a significant amount of aid, but they did not expect to get both.

In 1970 the United States government took the position of officially encouraging Spain to continue to seek closer relations with western Europe, including the eventual membership in NATO. This was standard policy for the United States to show official endorsement of Spanish economic progress. [57 p. 19] However, there seems to be an underlying assumption that this position is valid as long as the Spanish dependence on the United States remains. If negotiations were to fail to produce a new agreement, Spain would not be out in the cold as would have been the case in 1953 and possibly 1963. The economy was greatly strengthened by tourist trade and foreign investment. Spain had begun the process of economic integration into the European community. The worst that could happen if the negotiations failed would be a blow to the international status of Spain. Other recent events had already made their mark.

Efforts to improve relations with eastern Europe have so far resulted only in five consular agreements; long negotiations with the European Economic Community have produced only a trade agreement; and while Spain's special relationship with the Arab states is as rich as ever in flowery rhetoric, it has failed to avert an embarrassing quarrel with Morocco over the phosphate-dusted future of the Spanish Sahara. [25 p. 31]

All of these apparent setbacks are actually only a slow down of areas of advancement relative to the Spanish isolation of the 1950's.

2. United States Negotiation Difficulties

The positions and the goals of the two nations have been presented. The discussion will now concentrate on specific areas in which difficulties arose during negotiations and the factors which caused them. The actual text of the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was not released until it was signed on August 6, 1970. References to the agreement and the opposition to it from both United States and Spanish sources, therefore, were based on partial knowledge, rumors, and most probable courses of action.

As of May 1970, the Nixon administration had not discussed the new agreement with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the preceding six months. The administration was going to wait at least until the withdrawal of all American troops from Cambodia which was due on June 30, 1970, before raising again the Spanish Matter. [27 May 25, 1970, 15:1] In May, however, the State Department was hard at work on the agreement.

As in the case of previous Spanish-American negotiations, there was opposition to the entire idea because it involved association with the Franco autocratic regime. Should the United States place its long range interests in the hands of a 77 year old dictator who is coming under increasing opposition and who does not consult the representatives of the people before committing his nation? This position was put forth by individuals and newspapers that were convinced that overseas projection of United States power should not be dependent upon the Franco regime.

The 1970 agreement was delayed because of the degree of United States commitment as well as the legitimacy of the actual executive agreement procedure. Key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to raise questions relating to these two areas which eventually led to debating in the Senate concerning the relationship of the President and the Congress on setting foreign policy. [27 May 25, 1970, 15:1]

On July 24, 1970 after the State Department had completed basic negotiations for the new base agreement, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There was an immediate adverse reaction from the committee because of the vague wording proposed concerning the American commitment. [27 July 25, 1970, 2:5] The actual wording will be discussed later in this paper.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, became very concerned about the form of the new agreement. He stated that "... an agreement of 'such great potential importance' should take the form of a treaty which requires Senate ratification, rather than an Executive agreement between the two Governments." [27 July 25, 1970, 2:5] Since the Executive agreement does not require Senate approval, any commitment between the United States and Spain cannot be construed to have national legitimacy. This position would be clarified by the Senate on December 6, 1970 in conjunction with action taken on Resolution 469 which stated that the Senate had no part in the agreement and that there was no American commitment in it.

Senator Fulbright was also concerned about the hidden costs of the new agreement which he had estimated would be as high as \$400 million. This estimate included the value of the naval vessels that were to be loaned to Spain plus the value of the bases and other equipment that was to be given away. [27 August 3, 1970, 7:1]

On August 2, 1970, Senator J. W. Fulbright announced that he would seek through legislation to block the new agreement unless it was submitted to the Senate as a treaty. He demanded that an orderly representative process be used to insure that the form and the content of the agreement was in the national interest and that it would be agreeable to the majority. Senator Fulbright's "... proposal is to offer an amendment to the military procurement authorization

bill, now before the Senate, specifying that the Executive branch can spend no funds for troops or use of military bases in Spain except as a result of 'affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches through means of a treaty or convention.'" [27 August 3, 1970, 7:1] After nearly two years of negotiations delayed by Spanish demands for an American commitment or more aid, the administration was now faced with a very serious domestic threat to the proposed agreement.

In light of this new attack on the base agreement by Senator Fulbright, the administration decided to rush for a signature as soon as possible. They also refused to make public the text of the new agreement until after the signing. These two actions have led to an even wider gulf between the executive and legislative branches concerning responsibility for making foreign military commitments.

3. Spanish Negotiation Difficulties

Spain also had internal difficulties which threatened to disrupt the negotiation of the 1970 agreement. Even under the dictatorship of Franco, there was opposition to his foreign policies. There was also a general anti-American feeling in Spain caused by diplomatic errors, the Vietnam conflict, and the neutral United States position on Gibraltar. The combination of these factors added to the complexity of the negotiation process, which was already suffering from United States opposition.

During the base agreement discussions, the Spanish opposition represented by influential figures from the liberals, Socialists, Christian Democrats, and monarchists made a very concerted effort to present a solid front against Franco and in sympathy with the victimized population. Under the general leadership of Jose Maria de Areilza, the Count of Montrico and former Spanish ambassador, this group pursued a very dangerous approach to reform in light of the government policies of strict censorship and limited toleration of divergent political thought. The question of American presence in Spain was used as a banner to rally nationalistic support.

The attempts by the opposition to publish articles and to meet with foreign officials were met with resistance by the government as well as constant surveillance and suspicion which often resulted in court action and fines, which was the minimum punitive action usually administered. As an example, in response to efforts by the Count of Montrico and the opposition to meet with Secretary of State William Rogers when he visited Spain in May 1970, the government confiscated the Count's diplomatic passport and subjected him to police questioning. [27 June 11, 1970, 3:1]

The previously mentioned trip of Secretary of State Rogers was significant for two reasons. The first was related to the length of the visit. On May 30, 1970 after two years of negotiations, that Spain considered to be very important, he spent only 23 hours in Spain. The press was

very quick to air government as well as opposition displeasure with this apparent lack of concern on the part of the United States. Semi-official papers expressed the desire of the Spanish Government "... that Spain be treated as an equal in any new base agreement and be given guarantees to compensate for the risks run in allowing the bases to remain." [27 May 31, 1970, 2:6] The United States had offended the Spanish pride. This single factor is of extreme importance in any relationship with Spain. Pride is a strong binding force which can be used advantageously or it can have very detrimental effects on future cooperation. The American cultural context often does not understand foreign responses to "minor" offenses. To offend Spanish pride by neglecting equality and formality is bound to adversely affect the negotiation process.

The second significant factor of Secretary Roger's trip involved his relationship with the Spanish opposition. He was faced with the problem of whether or not to meet with the opposition. They had a petition signed by 120 sympathizers, which they desired to deliver in person to Mr. Rogers. The substance of this petition was a basic statement of their position on the agreement. Even though they used anti-American campaign procedures, they stated that they were not as interested in the use of the bases by the United States as they were in the fact that the Spanish people were not consulted in the making of the decision. [27 June 11, 1970, 3:1]

Secretary of State Rogers declined the request for an appointment and had the suggestion relayed to them that they should mail the petition to his office. Since recognition of any kind would be very dangerous to the United States position, Mr. Rogers really did not have a choice. The Spanish government watched the situation very carefully. Later they threatened to break off negotiations if any official United States recognition was given to the opposition. The petition was given to a member of Mr. Roger's party and later delivered to him.

The democratic opposition was naturally very critical of the American administration after this event for its lack of concern for their opinion and for the continued American willingness to give military and economic support to the Franco regime. The opposition also stated that this American position had strengthened anti-Americanism in Spain which had already been accelerated by their displeasure concerning American participation in the Vietnam conflict.

[25 p. 31]

The Spanish opposition viewed the Senatorial conflict over the agreement with optimism. If this could cause the agreement not to be signed, the opposition would gain influence, since removing the Americans was part of their campaign for popular support.

The dispute over the Spanish claim to Gibraltar had an indirect effect on the base agreement negotiation. Much to the displeasure of Spain, the United States did not take

the Spanish side against Gibraltar and Britain. In fact, the United States remained neutral on the matter which was obviously the safest position since any action would offend either Britain or Spain. But from Spain's point of view the United States simply was not providing proper political support. Spain was hoping for United States support since the base agreement was in a tenuous extension period. By remaining neutral, the United States angered the Spanish government, but remained on good relations with Britain. Negotiations, therefore, dragged on as Spain refused to decrease her demands. This continued until it was obvious that possible action by the United States Senate may completely cancel the negotiations and Spain could possibly lose her bargaining position.

The most important aspect of the Gibraltar question was how Franco used it. In the summer of 1969, he completely closed the border between Spain and Gibraltar. This climaxed a careful diplomatic and political campaign by Franco to rally support for his government under the banner of nationalism. The nation was united in its demand that Gibraltar be returned to Spain. In addition, the continual placing of restrictions on Gibraltar and the eventual isolation was a carefully planned method by which Franco could display his dislike of the British Labor Party and its leader Harold Wilson. [51 p. 252]

In connection with this Gibraltar question, it is interesting to note that the news coverage of the signing of the base agreement in 1970 attracted very little attention

from the British press. A very small article appeared in the Friday, August 7 edition of The Times. This was indicative of the general attitude of the Labor Party. Spain was a political thorn in their side because of Gibraltar. Franco's never ending campaign to gain control of this small strategic location usually kept the two nations politically at odds. Britain had just undergone an election in June 1970, in which the Labor Party was defeated; this might also explain the indifference.

In spite of the lengthy negotiations which were plagued by difficulties, an agreement was finally reached. Since the provisions of this agreement are in effect now, a discussion of the important points will be presented in order to understand the probable changes to be incorporated in future agreements. It is also important to consider how well this agreement was received by both nations.

4. The Agreement is Signed

The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain was signed in Washington, D.C. on August 6, 1970 by the Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio Lopez Bravo and Secretary of State William P. Rogers. [60 p. 237] It replaced the Defense Agreement of 1953 and its extensions. This new agreement provided for a much broader and constructive relationship between the two nations than the previous agreement. In addition to the specific defense related items, it included cooperation in such non-military fields as space,

educational exchange, science and technology, urbanization, environment, oceanography, and agriculture. [53 p. 219]

The new agreement makes the two nations appear more equal. The bases no longer are American or even joint Spanish-American; they are Spanish. The United States is granted simply the use of certain facilities. In the past, the United States was responsible for the defense of the bases; now Spain is. However, each nation retains the inherent right of self defense. In addition, Spain will be able to exercise greater control over the activities of the American forces stationed in Spain. This will be accomplished through the Joint Defense Committee and the Joint Control Center. In a sense, through these organizational bodies, Spain will be indirectly linked to NATO and the defense of Europe. This was very satisfactory to most Spanish military, since they generally desire integration into western defense. [25 p. 31]

In return for American use of Spanish military facilities, the United States agreed to assist Spain to strengthen its defense system by the extending of \$125 million in credit to buy military equipment plus an outright grant of \$20 million. The key item purchased by Spain with the credit was 36 F-4 Phantom aircraft. These planes were of an early type and were no longer being manufactured. Even though in a used condition, they would greatly improve the Spanish air force. This purchase was to be augmented by another purchase of 30 Mirage jets from France under a separate agreement. [27 July 31, 1970, 2:4]

Two very important features of the agreement should also be noted. First, the use by the Government of the United States of Spanish facilities would be free of all taxes, charges and encumbrances; all permanent structures belong to Spain. Second, the United States would support Spanish defense efforts by contributing to their defense industry modernization and provide military assistance, but these would be subject to approval of appropriations by Congress and United States legislation. [60 p. 240]

The most important part of the agreement was of course the extent of actual United States military commitment guaranteed to the defense of Spain. As in pre-signing discussions, the vagueness of the wording allows for various interpretations.

The State Department noted in its official statement of United States policy toward Spain in 1970 that the new base agreement was a symbol of American goodwill and cooperation with Spain, but, "the agreement does not embody any mutual defense commitment." [57 p. 19] This was how the United States interpreted the following quote from Chapter VIII of the agreement:

Consequently, both Governments, within the framework of their constitutional processes, and to the extent feasible and appropriate, will make compatible their respective defense policies in the areas of mutual interest, and will grant each other reciprocal defense support.

Each government will support the defense system of the other and make such contributions as are deemed necessary and appropriate to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness of these systems to meet possible contingencies. [60 p. 240]

Mr. John H. Morse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, later stated at hearings before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe on July 21, 1971 that, "On our part, these 'terms and conditions' provide only that the United States will make available certain items of military equipment and training, and help in modernizing Spanish defense industries, subject to the appropriation of necessary funds by the Congress." [53 p. 261]

So as far as the United States was concerned, the use of the bases was maintained; the cost was surplus military equipment, some aid, and non-military cooperation, but no commitment. The following very wise observation is probably the most candid remark made about the actual policy of the United States. "During the course of the negotiations, General Wheeler informed the Spanish: 'By the presense of the United States forces in Spain the United States gives Spain a far more visible and credibly guarantee than any written document'." [42 p. 177-178]

Attention must also be given to the Spanish opinion of the agreement as well as how we thought they felt. The agreement was completed and would not be changed for five years, but the Spanish degree of satisfaction with the 1970 agreement will bear heavily on the 1975 negotiations.

Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo presented the new agreement to the Foreign Relations Commission of the Cortes in much the same manner that the Secretary of State presented it to

the Senate. The Spanish government was trying to convince the Cortes and the country that the new agreement was good for Spain. Sr. Bravo stressed the point that in a time of transition, Spain needs the support of a great power. [27 July 31, 1970, 2:4] The term transition most likely refers to the economic growth, but it could mean political opposition or liberalization or even the decline of Franco.

The Spanish press, however, felt that Sr. Bravo had not given all the facts and also that the American aid was meager. There was also displeasure with the vagueness of the agreement, even though the government was satisfied that they had a greater commitment, the agreement did not seem anymore definitive than the 1963 agreement. In reference to this complaint that the American aid was meager, Edward King, a retired United States Army colonel, stated before the House of Representative Subcommittee on Europe that "Many of the upper and middle grade officers are convinced that the United States took advantage of an unsettled Spanish internal political situation to slip by what they consider was a steal of the base renewal." [53 p. 243] All the equipment was old or used and some of it was about to be put into storage. To attempt to maintain old equipment that is out of production is difficult for the United States: for another nation to even hope to keep it operational is almost impossible. For example, a World War II submarine, such as Spain was given, requires constant repair and careful maintenance to keep it operational.

If only a few minor repairs must be delayed because of lack of spare parts, the submarine is unsafe and therefore non-operational and non-functional except as a display item.

The Spanish opposition presented its dissatisfaction with the base agreement by making their own prediction.

"Professor Enrique Tierno Galvan, one of the opposition leaders, said, 'When democratic forces govern Spain, we shall not feel obliged to respect this pact.'" [49 August 8, 1970, 3:d] They were also confident that a struggle to block the agreement would continue in Spain and the United States as the people become more aware of their rights and powers.

American governmental officials often like to comment on how they think the Spanish people feel about the agreement. One such official, Mr. Arva Floyd from the European Bureau of the Department of State, stated on July 19, 1971, "It is an agreement which the Spanish Government and Spanish people support and I do not foresee any problems for the next 5-year period." He went on to say, "As in any free press, there have been articles in Spanish press asking why do we need bases? What do we get out of it? But generally it is acceptable." [53 p. 226] These are sweeping generalities put forth to convince the American people that the United States did the best she could and Spain is happy. Mr. Floyd neglected to note a few specific facts.

On March 18, 1966 the rules for governing the Spanish press were laid down. The free press that Mr. Floyd referred

to exists in name only. The new regulations abolished censorship, but administrative powers of confiscation were maintained. The authorities must receive copies of all papers one hour before they are sent out for distribution. Offenses under the previous censorship law were subject to administrative penalties, but now they may be punishable by fines and prison sentences. This regulation was expanded to include all journalists and editors on March 31, 1966. In other words, the new law on the press had not changed the political content on the papers; they still reflected generally what the government desired. [13 p. 334]

If Mr. Floyd based his evaluation of the support of the people on the content of the Spanish "free press", he made a serious error. To assume that no opinion is equivalent to passive support is also a mistake. Neither the Spanish nor the American people were consulted or even made aware of the text of the negotiation or the form of the agreement. It is also not possible to conclude that popular support is present merely because non-military aid was included in the agreement. The population as a group of individuals does not hope to realize any gain from this aid. For these reasons, most of the Spanish people are generally indifferent about the agreement.

In conclusion, Spain stubbornly worked for two years to get a defense commitment or alternatively a large amount

of American aid. Along the way the United States refused to negotiate for a defense treaty, went to the executive agreement format, showed some disregard for Spanish pride, refused to give any support to Spain concerning Gibraltar, and succeeded in getting vague wording, and an agreement on a small amount of aid. Does the United States negotiate so superbly or is it just lucky?

The process of negotiation goes back to the old principle of, "I have something you need, what is it worth to you?" Both sides realized that the United States still held the upper hand; Spain was still dependent on America for aid and to a greater degree commercial trade. There was also an indirect dependence on the United States for defense both support and mere presence. No other nation could provide the military aid that Spain desired with the exception of the Soviet Union which Spain would not even consider. Spain held out as long as possible and tried to assert its independence and concern for equality.

The United States, in one sense, used luck to force a settlement. The Senatorial disagreement with the administration was a sign to both sides and especially Spain that they better sign now. It was better for Spain to sign now rather than being forced to wait and possibly be offered less for the bases. The United States "got a good deal;" It may have been the last.

Since 1970, Spain has continued a slow concerted move to integrate into the European community. If the scale of dependence shifts in favor of Europe instead of the United States, so also will the upper hand in negotiations shift. A change in the form of the Spanish government may hasten this process.

The 1970 agreement expires September 1975. A declaration of principles was begun by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and signed on July 9, 1974 by President Nixon, thereby, officially beginning negotiations for a renewal of the agreement. Our needs are the same as before, but now Spain may be able to more equally bargain and in fact possibly even hold the upper hand.

IV. SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

Spanish foreign policy can be described best as a slow continual movement away from isolation. Spanish heritage compels the nation to seek its rightful place as an influential member in European as well as world affairs. The same Spain that helped discover the New World is desperately trying to reassert its place in the Old.

The Spanish Civil War almost completely destroyed the economic as well as the political structure of Spain. The nation was left without monetary wealth or allies willing to rebuild Spain. The isolation imposed on Spain by many of the European nations following World War II was another event which furthered the unfortunate suppression of Spanish advancement since the beginning of the end of the Spanish Empire in 1492.


This date that is remembered as the year Columbus discovered America was a very important year in the future of Spain. Two decisions made at this time would begin a chain of events that would cause the expanding empire to decline and have effects on future Spanish advancements. The first decision was the elimination of all Jews from Spain. By doing so a large segment of the merchant class in Spain was lost just at a time when the expanding empire was in need of trading expertise. The second event was the forcing out of Spain of the last of the Moorish Kings from Granada thereby

removing a large elite segment from Spanish society. [21 p. 24]
The result of these two actions was the inability of Spain to support its growing areas of influence. This stagnation of Spanish development would continue to be felt even today as technology and modernization occur in neighboring European nations while Spain is continually trying to catch up.

In the last ten years Spain has acquired significant economic advances but only by relying on American and European bases of trading and scientific knowledge. What has happened during this period has and will continue to affect Spanish Foreign policy. Prosperity has caused the people of Spain to more closely evaluate foreign influence instead of blindly accepting aid and investments without consideration of consequences. For example, it is no longer valid to assume that Spain will remain dependent on the United States and that American military presence will be desired. The times have changed since the 1953 opening of the isolation barriers to Spain; governments in Europe and the United States have changed hands frequently; limited conflicts have demanded foreign policy positions. Only one thing remains constant and is still the controlling force in Spain: Franco.

The poles of Spanish foreign policy are illustrated by Figure 2 and discussed in the following sections.

THE POLES OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY



TYPE OF INFLUENCE

- === MAJOR DIRECT
- MINOR DIRECT
- - - INDIRECT

Figure 2

A. SPAIN — A EUROPEAN NATION

The most important long range foreign policy concern of Spain is its relationship to the individual nations of Europe and to the European community as a single body. Geographically Spain is obviously a member of Europe and indeed a link between Europe and Africa; but politically Spain still is an outcast from the community. General Franco's tight control policies have prevented Spain from assuming its proper role in development with the surrounding group of nations.

Spain was forced to wait until the decade of the 60's to begin to receive any recognition by the European nations. While Spain lay economically dormant from the end of World War II until 1960, the nations of Europe had rebuilt, expanded, prospered, and begun to integrate. Their economies began to grow outside their boundaries and were seeking new undeveloped areas. Europe began to realize that Spain had resources which were well worth developing. The dilemma of old memories versus new riches was being faced by all European nations. The most important fact was that even though the European nations had changed leaders and forms of government since 1940, Spain was still ruled by the same dictator. "As the regime of General Franco lengthened and became embodied in every aspect of Spanish society, ostracism has taken on a personal identification with Franco himself." [52 p. 15] He has been, and is, the personification of all the past adverse feeling which Europeans have felt toward Spain.

Spain is no longer dormant economically. General Franco slowly changed his policies and has given Spain a new for a prosperous future as well as respectability among nations of the World. Spain appears to be slowly moving toward integration into the European community. Under the influence of modern minded technocrats, Spain has placed the greatest emphasis on economic unity with Europe. There have been changes in the domestic political scene which indicate a trend toward modernization in keeping with European standards. Since the area separating economics and politics is often vague, the relation between the two processes will be stressed in the following discussion rather than the differences. This interaction will also be analyzed in respect to the application to internal Spanish military matters and the overall security of Europe.

From 1933 until 1966 General Franco ruled Spain with absolute authority which he seemed to believe would continue forever. He made no provisions for a successor. On November 1966 the Cortes (the Parliament of Spain) gave its expressed unanimous approval to the Organic Laws. General Franco suddenly became concerned with an orderly turnover of his power which he naturally wanted to go to someone of his choice. In the Organic Law he consolidated older laws and clarified administrative procedures. The most important section of the Law provided for the eventual division of his solitary position into two equal offices, the Head of State and the

important if Spain is to become a democracy similar to European nations and thereby recognized as an equal. [15 p. 8]

On June 8, 1973 Admiral Blanco was appointed as the Prime Minister of Spain, thereby, acquiring in theory one-half of Franco's power. In actuality, Franco was still Head of State and still in absolute control. He allowed Admiral Blanco to select his own cabinet of ministers, and to institute minor policies of his own as well as continue supervising the everyday functions of government.

Just as political liberalization was beginning to make progress, Admiral Blanco was assassinated on December 20, 1973. Spain's first attempt to orderly transfer leadership had been spoiled. This led to a set-back in the schedule of modernization of political processes. The government resorted to its proven method of control; expeditious and strict military procedures were instigated to assure order.

According to his own law, General Franco had ten days to select a new Prime Minister from a list of three names presented to him by the Council of the Realm. From December 20 until 29 the Vice Prime Minister, Senor Fernandez Miranda, was the acting Prime Minister. On the 29th of December Senor Carlos Arias Navarro was appointed to the position of Prime Minister. As his predecessor, he also was a faithful follower of Franco and a long time friend.

Senor Navarro's first official task was the naming of his new cabinet. In doing so he carefully removed all previous

ministers who were members of the Catholic layman organization known as Opus Dei (the members are often referred to as technocrats). General Franco has recently attacked the Opus Dei as an organization that is sowing discord in Spanish institutions which are in good health. He and the armed forces distrust the Catholic organization and are very watchful of its activities. [25 p. 11] The purge by Navarro included the replacement of Senor Rodo by Senor Cortina as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The significance of this move is that Franco and possibly the new Prime Minister fear the power and influence that this lay organization has obtained through the influence of its cabinet members. General Franco had restrained the right-wing elements and had allowed the technocrats to progress in modernizing the Spanish economy, to open Spain to foreign investment, and to seek a closer relationship with the European community. Franco now seems to fear the power that they have acquired. [25 p. 5]

The primary founders of the economic miracle, Senor Bravo and Senor Rodo, have both been removed from their Ministry positions because of their political power. This is difficult to explain since Spain has only one legal political party, the National Movement. The Opus Dei is political, but it is also legal because it is an organization of the official church of Spain. For Spain to display any political modernization, the government must recognize the other parties that exist within the country and in foreign exile as representative of popular interest groups.

On February 12, 1974, Prime Minister Navarro announced a new liberalization policy that would be instituted if law and order could be maintained. The mayors of cities and the presidents of provincial councils are to be elected rather than appointed by the Minister of Interior. The government is also considering making the Cortes, the sindicatos or government-run trade unions, and the only political party more representative. Navarro also indicated that the Spaniards of today should be able to form political groups, so as to permit meaningful elections of officials. [38 p. 41]

This was only an announcement of possibilities, not a guarantee of institution; but it is verbal hope for the people in a time of political anxiety. It is a strong indication that Franco is trying to realistically prepare his nation for his rapidly approaching death which could create a political vacuum. The new liberal policies have the appearance of coming directly from the Prime Minister, thereby, shifting public attention and support to that office; he is their way to a new future, if he has the support of the Spanish army and the people. The office of Head of State (or as it is often called the King of Spain) after the death of Franco will probably be more symbolic than functional especially considering the non-committal character of Juan Carlos.

Political structural similarities with European nations are only beginning to appear. The conclusion should not be reached that there is neither hope for integration nor that

Spain does not desire it. In particular, the reader must remember that internal Spanish political modernization is often hidden by world news reporting of instances of repressive tactics directed against minority groups, regional ethnic conflicts, and student and worker problems. World opinion is generally one-sided since the good news of successful programs is rarely reported. News censorship is also still practiced in Spain.

In May of 1972 the illegal Spanish Socialist Party which has open offices in France and an underground segment in Spain issued the following statement: "Both parties (French and Spanish branches) '... consider that the juridical - political isolation with relation to a united Europe ... in which our country finds itself harmful for the present and future of Spain.' The '... unavoidable demands of an historical, cultural, social, political and economic nature ...' make Spain's eventual participation in the Community a necessity." [49 May 18, 1972, 8:a] This statement summarizes the general feelings of Spain toward integration: it is a necessity for the future.

However, the consensus of opinion in Europe agrees that as long as Franco is alive there is no hope for Spanish entry into European politics, the European Community (formally the European Economic Community or EEC), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This exclusion does not include all areas of trade and investments, nor does it include the

prosperous tourist industry, by which Spain has made great economic progress thereby starting the integration process.

[52 p. 15]

The present status of relations with the key European nations of Great Britain, France, and West Germany is important in considering how well Spain has overcome its isolation. Each nation has strong economic ties with Spain, but particular political problems still plague the relationships.

The relations between Great Britain and Spain continue to be strained over the question of Gibraltar. In 1972 negotiations between the two nations resumed after a five year deadlock. Sir Alec Douglas Home and Senor Lopez Bravo conducted extensive discussions in London and Madrid: no agreement was reached. Spain wants Gibraltar under Spanish control and Britain wants to protect the right of the English people of Gibraltar who want to govern themselves. Spain has sealed it off from the continent until an arrangement can be reached. Negotiations resumed on July 19, 1972 in London in a serious attempt to ease tensions. However, the Spanish refused to lift the blockade and the British required an agreement to reopen the frontier as an essential prerequisite for effective progress toward the resolution of the problem. A standstill has resulted concerning the future of Gibraltar.

Spanish relations with France are generally very good. The nationalistic independent foreign policies of the two nations are similar. They cooperate because it is mutually

beneficial to do so. As one example, "In June, 1970 the Spaniards signed an agreement for military cooperation with the French, and since then there have been joint manoeuvres as well as important defense contracts; Spain is for example, manufacturing Mirage fighters under licence from France."

[25 p. 13] As another example, on January 29, 1973, France and Spain signed two agreements on the delimitation of their continental shelf and territorial waters in the Bay of Biscay. The bay was divided in half with a special zone near the center in which the two countries would cooperate in the exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves. Similar negotiations are taking place concerning the continental shelf in the Mediterranean.

[46 p. 26377]

Limited political conflict does exist between France and Spain concerning the tolerant attitude of the French government toward exiled anti-Franco organizations in France. There has been recent agitation between the two countries concerning the reluctance of France to restrict the activities of the Spanish regional political group known as the Basques (ETA) which is located near the Spanish-French border on the Atlantic coast. This outlawed organization was responsible for the assassination of the former Prime Minister, Admiral Blanco. This event caused the Spanish government to make strong accusations that the French authorities were tolerating the use of Southern France as a base for terrorist activities directed against Spain. [49 December 28, 1973, 1:d]

Spanish relations with West Germany are entirely economic and will be discussed in relation to the European Community.

The area of economic integration is intimately related with any future integration of Spain. It is the first step toward true international recognition, and is very relevant to future political and military unity with Europe.

In 1972 a special study group from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives summarized its findings on European integration as being progressive on mainly the economic issues and specifically on trade matters relating to common agricultural policies. These trade agreements constitute the materials of which the political future of Europe will be made. [52 p. 2] The study group witnessed an application of the functionalist theory of integration as put forth by Ernst Haas. He emphasized economic cooperation and interaction as a preliminary step toward political integration through politization. Learned political behavior is acquired by a spillover process from the learned cooperative habits in the areas of interaction, such as trade agreements. The nations begin to behave more as a union as common needs draw them together or an external threat forces them to seek refuge in unity. Common political institutions and functions follow as an expected result.

Spain is far from political unity with Europe, but the economic miracle that has occurred in Spain since 1960 may complement the integrative progress already made by the

European nations. During this period, Spain achieved one of the highest growth rates in Europe; for once there was a positive balance of trade. This was caused by a combination of three factors: the boom in the tourist trade, foreign investment, and wages of migratory workers in other countries. [25 p. 23] "The economic stabilization program of 1959 and the devaluation of the peseta together with its realignment on a simple, fixed exchange basis, engineered by the Opus Dei technocrats in the cabinet with the help of foreign experts, laid the groundwork for the prodigious developmental growth ever since." [12 p. 1]

The economic integration of Spain into the European community would progress rapidly if Spain were able to gain full membership in the Common Market. International politics prevent this from happening. According to the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC in 1958, the approval of admission is based on a unanimous decision of the member nations. The Treaty also required that the member nations be peaceful and democratic. Here lies the center of Spain's integration problem.

France is generally in favor of Spain becoming a member of the European Community mainly because of the geographic reasons. West Germany is not adverse to Spain's admission but the political party in power is the key factor in the German position. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are much more receptive to such a proposal. Italy has not openly

advocated Spanish membership in the Community, but the opinion is that Italy is not adverse to the idea with the exception of a very vocal left faction and the businessmen concerned about the competition Spanish products especially fruits and olive oil may create. Belgium believes that Spain should be a member, but that a change in the internal political structure in Spain is a prerequisite. The Netherlands is against any idea of a member nation with a dictatorship form of government. In response to a statement by the former French President Pompidou in which he said that he favored immediate admission of Spain, the Prime Minister of Denmark made the following statement: "We would use our veto, just as we did when Spain was proposed for membership in NATO. If Denmark is going to be a member of the Community it will not be possible to obtain the required unanimous approval of membership: but I am sure that Denmark would not be alone in taking this stand." [49 September 23, 1972, 4:b]

In summary the small nations of Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands will not approve membership of Spain until it is Democratic. A press release by the European Parliament through the European Information Service dated March 16, 1974 reaffirmed the above 1972 position on Spain's entry into the EEC.

"These continual violations perpetrated by the Spanish government against human rights and the rights of the citizen and its intolerance of the rights of minorities hinder the entry of Spain into the Common Market."

In spite of the rejection of Spanish membership in the Common Market, Spain has reached a Preferential Trade Agreement with the Community. Under the careful supervision of the Foreign Minister, Senor Lopez Bravo, the agreement was signed on June 29, 1970. The agreement called for mutual tariff reductions and import liberalizations. It was meant to be the first stage of a two stage agreement. [43 p. 16] Senor Bravo described the agreement as "... the first, irreversible step in Spain's progressive integration into the European continent." [May 11, 1972, 19:a] With the recent enlargement of the Common Market in January of 1973, new temporary protocols were signed to maintain the present agreement for one year during which time negotiations would take place to renew the old agreement. The new one would come into force on January 1, 1974, unless difficulties arise because of Britain's doubts about membership; also a loss of the lucrative British market would be a severe blow to the Spanish economy. [46 p. 25713]

The EEC's public show of disunity in the early months of 1974 has been watched very carefully by Spain. The right wing would be enthusiastic about a split of the Nine which could lead to a revival of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The EEC supporters in Spanish government see the period of disunity as a possible chance to acquire full membership.

Spain is more eager than ever to get into the EEC since it appears Britain will remain a member. Also Spain is concerned because of the 1.5 million Spaniards who worked in EEC countries, and contributed \$700 million to the balance of payments in 1972. A return of these emigrants would mean a blow to the balance of payments and also a severe unemployment problem in Spain. These workers have been in areas with free trade unions and would probably resist changing back to restrictive labor conditions that exist in Spain; internal unrest could easily result if the return occurred. Since some EEC nations have indicated that priority in job availabilities will be given to EEC workers, membership in the EEC for Spain is beginning to appear as a necessity not only for international economics but also for internal political stability.

Through trade agreements, Spain finally realized some degree of formal recognition. The nations of Europe are extremely interested in Spain as an area to expand their economies. Through capital investment, the major nations of Europe have financed industries in Spain, thereby giving them a large and growing stake in Spanish prosperity. The rapid integration of Spain into Europe economically remains governed by political restrictions. This economic cooperation appears to have a strong influence on the new internal political liberalization policies in Spain, as well as bring the nations of Europe closer together. Spain is now making

a serious effort to conform to the standards of her European neighbors so as to increase all forms of integration.

The most obvious advantage of any form of European integration is the economic growth that Spain would continue to enjoy. Exclusion from the European market may not only greatly affect Spanish agriculture exports, but it may destroy the market for the growing production of manufactured goods. Since the peseta was devalued in 1967, and partially floated in 1974, these goods are in great demand in the European Community. The business interests of all the European nations are very much in favor of economic integration. Political integration may some day begin to appear, but it will be only a by product of the economic cooperation. [11 p. 34]

Spain has been transformed into a modern consumer society. The per capita national income has surpassed the magic \$1000 figure. The strength of this economy has enabled Spain to create and retain foreign confidence. The nation has worked a modern miracle of economic success but is still burdened with an antiquated political system.

In summary, the economic problem now facing Spain is that over one-half of Spanish exports go to either Common Market nations or European Free Trade Association nations. Spain depends on trade with countries which belong to private clubs which it is not allowed to join. Spanish trade is also threatened in the North American community. Fifteen per cent of Spain's total exports go to an American market that is

liable to change at anytime depending on the party in office and the strength of the lobbies demanding protection from foreign products. [11 p. 34]

Spain sponsors very little internal research and development. Technology is purchased abroad, mainly from the United States, West Germany, and Italy. There is also minor dependence on other nations for this commodity which may carry with it some degree of implicit control over industrial progress in Spain. An integrated community would foster a greater and freer flow of technological advancements. [12 p. 2]

The above advantages of economic integration may be partially realized without any further political cooperation, but it would probably never equal the advancements already made by the Common Market. Democracy in keeping with the definitions of Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands is the key to further integration in any area. When they are satisfied that the people of Spain are truly represented in government, then their opinion may change. However, as long as the symbol of their historic adverse feelings, General Franco, is in control of Spain, true recognition will be withheld. History has spoken even time and money will not completely erase the memories.

Therefore, the most important event which will influence the integration of Spain into Europe will be the death of Franco. Even though at the age of 81 he still appears to be in complete control of the nation, the army is actually

providing the stability which is preserving order as political anxiety builds; the army will preserve the nation through the turmoil of his death. In spite of the fact that Franco has made preliminary steps for orderly passage of power, political conflict will naturally result in his absence. The Opus Dei technocrats will most likely assume control since they are the most organized and experienced. They will be able to guarantee continued economic growth as well as enlist the confidence of the Army. These two requirements are necessary for future Spanish politicians and political organization. The other exiled and underground parties and trade unions will provide the government with feedback from the people as well as requirements for their welfare.

Therefore, if the technocrats obtain control easily and quickly in cooperation with the present liberal Navarro regime, economic and possibly political and military integration will advance rapidly. The present trend toward adapting internal political structure in an effort to correspond with European national and Community structure is an indication of Spanish intent and sincerity. Since the integration of the military is much more related to cultural pride, it will not proceed quite as rapidly unless a real military threat exists in Europe.

The vacuum of Franco's death may, on the other hand, throw Spain backward. Political chaos may keep Spain so involved with internal problems for an extended period and thereby

prohibit even the thought of any political activity on any international level. Europe will recognize Spain only when they are confident that Spain is politically stable, and most certainly not until Franco is dead.

The solution of the Gibraltar problem is also a prerequisite for political integration. Even though Great Britain has invested great amounts of capital in Spain and is a major contributor of tourists, political cooperation remains an unapproachable subject. Again, it appears that Franco's death will be the beginning point of negotiations. The prosperity of the Spanish area around Gibraltar due to the tourist trade may change the direction of envious gazers at the border gate. The people of Gibraltar may possibly even seek Spanish control after Franco dies since their small area is no longer the center of prosperity that it once was. The institution of democracy may also influence the decision of the people of Gibraltar.

The growing economy of Spain is giving it a stronger voice in world business. It may even serve as a wedge to force political concessions and recognition, but it is best used as a coercive device to foster faith and trust of the world nations. Between now and Franco's death, the nation must prepare itself for democracy if it is to be accepted politically by the European nations; any other course of action will certainly decelerate, if not stop, any form of integration. The nations of Europe are anxious to see the new Spain,

but they will be very critical of its form. Spain will have one chance to catch the train to European unity and prosperity, but she must buy the ticket now and with her own resources. It is also high time that the West accepts Spain for what it is; a corner of Europe with a part to play in the security and prosperity of the whole.

B. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

The first ten years of the 1953 Base Rights and aid agreement were of great value to Spain which was in severe economic trouble and in post-war isolation. Since 1963, United States aid has decreased. For the most part, this aid has been in the form of military assistance and cash to purchase used military equipment. (See Table 1)

The Spanish government continues to provide the same excellent bases, but they do not feel that Spain is receiving equitable payment, especially when compared to the benefits and aid that NATO countries receive. [25 p. 12] The report of a special congressional study mission to Europe in 1972 stated that "The expectation of substantial American military aid has never been fulfilled to Spanish satisfaction." [52 p. 16] In addition Spain has never received a mutual security pact such as enjoyed by all NATO nations. The present 1970 agreement, as discussed earlier, links Spain and the United States together, but because of the intentional vagueness concerning defense relations and its specific rent requirements for United States usage of bases it has proven to be ineffective. The

TABLE 1

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
 SPAIN 1950-1971 [53 p. 260]
 (in thousands of dollars)

TYPE	FISCAL YEAR									
	1950-63	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	
Military Assistance Plan (average per year)	491,349 35,096)	33,174	8,210	19,244	19,150	2,835	2,264	25,000	25,000	
Foreign Military Sales	4,595	2,697	25,067	22,495	122,899	22,421	15,157	26,585	115,800	
Cash	(2,295)	(2,697)	(25,067)	(22,495)	(122,899)	(22,421)	(15,157)	(26,585)	(115,800)	
Credit	(2,300)									
Excess Stocks Acquisition Value	37,079	780	90	4,344	91	2,372		15,586	50	

greatest link between the nations in the form of trade, investment, and tourism is largely independent of the agreement.

Spain has derived some sense of equality with European nations militarily through the bilateral agreement. The Joint Committee established in Article 36 of Chapter VIII of the 1970 agreement is composed of the Foreign Minister of Spain and the United States Ambassador to Spain as Co-Chairmen, with the Chief of the Spanish High General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command (CINCEUR) as military advisers. Since CINCEUR also has a NATO position, there is a linkage between Spain and NATO. This association appears to be as close as Spain will get to a multilateral security organization, at least as long as Franco is alive.

However, Spain has shown support of the Soviet-promoted European Security Conference which stresses Europe as a unit including all nations within the geographic area. This support appears to be mainly a threat to force the United States as well as NATO into realizing that Spain should have an active voice in the defense of Europe. The vague, passive, bilateral relationship with the United States does not provide the equality, and respectability that Spain desires.

In the past the United States provided significant economic aid as well as military equipment. This situation no longer exists. Trade with Europe and the resulting Spanish prosperity has made Spain less dependent economically on the United States. The United States share of the Spanish import market

has dropped from an average of 17.4 percent (67-70) to 15.4 percent in 1972. In the same year 15.3 percent of Spain's total export was directed toward the United States. At the same time over 50% of Spain's total trade was conducted with members of the EEC and EFTA (European Free Trade Association). [8 p. 12]

American military aid and equipment is not essential since many items such as artillery, submarines, jet fighters, and all sizes of surface vessels can now be built in Spain. Most of the equipment is under contract for other nations but the technology is either present in Spain now or it may be purchased from European nations.

The bilateral relationship with the United States remains as a strong pole of Spanish foreign policy as long as the present regime under Franco is in power. A governmental change will most certainly bring a serious reevaluation of the only remaining significant factor of the relationship between Spain and the United States: base rights.

The American foreign policy toward Spain continually supports Spanish integration into Europe even though this position will certainly erode some of the benefits that the United States has enjoyed on a bilateral status. However, since the United States and the European community are closely linked together through multi-national organizations, the integration of Spain should in fact add to the Spanish-American relationship. The amount of remaining dependence on the United States

may soon be measured as Spain makes public its foreign policy toward the United States as negotiations begin for the renewal of the 1970 agreement.

C. NATO AND THE SPANISH MILITARY

Officially the Spanish government views NATO as an institution of the past which has served its purpose and will soon be replaced. "..... the EC represents, in aspiration, the opportunity for Spain to recover its rightful place in Europe." [52 p. 15] This seemingly blunt position against NATO would not preclude a Spanish acceptance of an invitation for membership. Spain would welcome a mutual defense agreement, but the deep national pride forbids any subservient status. Spain was isolated by the victorious Europeans following World War II in 1945: now they must make the first gesture of good faith.

Spain views its position in the defense of Europe as being essential. She has consistently taken an anti-communism stand and has successfully suppressed any significant internal influence. In contrast, Italy and France are weak because of the infiltration of Communism into the political structure of the nations. Spain also realizes that it is of great geographic value as the guardian of the entrance to the Mediterranean and the European link with Africa.

The integration of the Spanish military into the defense structure of Europe would bring increased aid, modernization of equipment, and greater world respect. Membership in a

European defense alliance would also be an advantage in terms of the exchange of intelligence and defense technology. Most of all, it would provide a nuclear umbrella. At present the United States nuclear submarines at the base at Rota are dedicated to American national defense which also implies the defense of NATO European nations. The Spanish pride has been offended by twenty years of rejection. If Europe as a unity does not accept Spain, then it seems very likely that she will seek an alliance or relationship with a single nation such as France.

A military integration of Spain into a European organization such as NATO would place a burden on the Spanish budget. This disadvantage would probably be overshadowed by the aid Spain would receive from the other nations. General Franco has been able to reduce defense spending mainly by efficiently using the military aid that the United States has provided. In 1970 the Spanish defense expenditure per capita was \$19. Turkey was the only European country with a lower figure (\$14). [8 p. 46] Franco has been able to maintain a strong professional army that completely supports his regime, thereby allowing him to remain in power. Through the loyalty of the army, Franco maintains authoritarian control; through the respect of the people, the army symbolizes national unity and maintains order and stability.

Spain's armed forces number about 300,000, of which two-thirds are eighteen month conscripts. The officer corps has

come to resemble a separate caste which continues from generation to generation. They are seldom seen and they live apart from the rest of society. They are forbidden from taking part in politics, thereby, preserving their symbol of the impartial national arbiter of politics and future solidarity. However, recently low military pay, referenced to inflation, has forced many professional military personnel to seek additional employment. This factor plus the recent shift of society from the far right political position to little left of center has caused a beginning of a new form of dissent in Spain that may have a strong influence in the nation's future.

NATO is a major factor in Spanish integration into Europe. Since the small-member nations oppose the admission of a dictatorship such as Spain, the Franco government has not been able to use this organization as a means of integration. The United States has repeatedly petitioned for Spanish membership with no success. The new liberalization policies now being introduced in Spanish internal politics, may lead to future membership in NATO as well as the EEC. Membership in itself is not a goal but rather an additional step toward the integration. NATO affects Spanish integration mainly as an added benefit of belonging to the European club. Spanish membership is not a national goal since through bilateral relationship with the United States, Spain participates in a passive way in the defense of the West. Through the indirect relationship, Spain derives a source of equality with European nations in NATO.

D. PORTUGAL

The recent change in the government of Portugal has attracted a great deal of attention from all segments of the Spanish population. Since the dictatorship form of government present in Portugal prior to the coup was similar to Francoism, parallels have been projected toward future events in Spain. As Portugal tries to organize a government on a democratic platform careful note is taken by the Spanish of the success or failure of each step.

The events taking place in Portugal have an indirect effect on Spanish foreign policy. The reactions caused by these events relative to Spanish internal politics are more important to a thorough understanding of future Spanish policy than their effect on the government of Portugal. Therefore, the results rather than the causes are discussed below.

The Spanish government has taken precautions to keep the political disorder of Portugal out of Spain. Border restrictions have been imposed and news coverage of Portuguese events is carefully monitored. But now, there is also a new sense of caution present; the far right might not be the safest position should a similar event happen in Spain. Therefore, as inflation, political uncertainty, business cutbacks, and strikes grow in severity and frequency the threat to the Franco government is not across the border but rather from internal unrest. This has always been present to some extent but it was always effectively countered by the internal military

structure. This force still exists but now as the problems grow in number and complexity brute force may not be the proper method to be used to solve them.

A recent survey published by the Magazine Cambio revealed that the Spaniards who are not content with their present political system and desire a democratic regime outnumber those who are satisfied by over two to one. In the middle class the ratio is three to one and in the upper class it is four to one. [65 p. 39] There appears to be an opportunistic rush to the left especially by publishers, lawyers, bankers, civil servants, trade union officials, and teachers. Even the army has had some movement of this type but mainly in the junior ranks. Association with the left and its democratic socialism seems to be the way to establish a political alibi just in case a change in the regime does occur and the resulting political vacuum is filled by the left. For 35 years the Franco regime's propaganda has tried to discredit both democracy and marxism. Since most of the resistance to the government has been by communists, the effect of the propaganda has been to glamorize the left.

Portugal, therefore has an indirect effect on Spanish foreign policy through the internal political unrest in Spain. It is still too early to evaluate how this will affect European integration. If some form of democratic government precipitates, as appears will be the case, then all European nations will be much more receptive to complete acceptance of Spain

as an equal. Portugal's experience may be a catalyst which will force Spanish government officials to accelerate liberalization in order to avoid an internal crisis that would destroy much of the progress witnessed since 1960. It also serves as a test of Spain's ability to prove to other nations that it is politically stable and able to adapt to changing conditions.

E. OIL AND THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab world is an important pole affecting Spanish foreign policy. Just as Europe has its attractive force of trade and tourism and the United States has its trade and respectability, the Arab world has its valuable resource — oil. During the past twenty years, Spain has been generally sympathetic with Arab causes and has followed an independent policy similar to France. Since being admitted to the United Nations in 1955, Spain has consistently backed Arab initiatives. In addition to the oil factor, Spain has historically had interest in Africa because of colonial possessions some of which were inhabited by Arabs.

A future energy crisis will not affect Spain very much. Even though energy consumption is growing rapidly in Spain, as cars and other consumer goods are distributed in the growing economy, the past relations with Arab and African nations will insure a steady supply of oil. Today Spain is dependent on foreign sources for 100 per cent of its natural gas, 96 per cent of its petroleum, and 98 per cent of its uranium for

nuclear power. All of the natural gas comes from Libya. Ninety per cent of the petroleum comes from the Middle East and North Africa. Spain has been informed by the Arab oil exporting consortium that she is a "friendly" nation and that her oil needs will all be met. [12 p. 4]

This excellent relationship with Arab oil suppliers has been threatened by the American pole of Spanish foreign relations. The past Mid-East crises involving Israel and Arab nations has placed Spain in a politically dangerous position concerning the use of American leased bases as support points for Israel. The economic issue of oil has kept Spain very cautious and slightly on the pro-Arab side. Spain has never officially recognized Israel. The United States has been limited in the use of the Spanish bases to mercy missions only. In the 1967 Six-Day War, Spain allowed 3,400 Americans evacuated from Libya and Algeria to await transfer at Spanish bases. Officials have intimated that these bases probably would not be available for direct support of any future Arab/Israeli conflict or even any Soviet/American conflict that could result. The consultation clause of the 1970 agreement, however, does leave this option open and undecided. For example, during the September 1970, Jordanian crisis, ammunition resupply flights to Jordan used Spanish bases. The resupply of the Sixth Fleet through the base at Rota was uninterrupted. [8 p. 17]

Spain has basically four options available concerning the United States base issue as referenced to a Middle East conflict:

1. Support the Arabs
2. Complete neutrality
3. Allow free usage of Spanish bases
4. Participate in conflict militarily

Each option has an associated risk. Spanish active support for the Arabs would seriously disrupt United States and European relations. A neutral position would be under great scrutiny by the Arab nations. Base availability and military participation would obviously bring serious action by the Arab nations. The fuel supply for Spain's growing economy would most certainly be limited or possibly cut off. The present Spanish position lying in between the first and second options appears to be the safest and most logical for existing conditions.

On a bilateral basis, Spain has signed cultural, educational and commercial agreements with Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. [8 p. 16] These continuing displays of Spanish goodwill and interest in Arab development are very important to Spain's goals of international dignity and economic success. Spain must be able to balance the political-economic forces of Europe, the United States, and the Middle East to its own individual needs.

Spain weathered the 1973-74 energy crisis quite well; none of the foreign policy poles were greatly affected. Another crisis may force the European Community to seek greater unity in order to strengthen their bargaining position for petroleum products, but it would be unlikely to strengthen Spanish integration since Spain does not need Europe's group voice to secure oil. However, any change of the Spanish foreign policy position concerning Middle East affairs may force Spain toward closer European association. Alliance with the European Communities and its integrated position would probably take priority since more than just oil is at stake. Europe represents western technology, international respectability, trade, and possibly military security.

F. COLONIAL POSSESSIONS

Spain presently has three colonies left in Africa. The two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are located along the Mediterranean coast of Morocco. The largest colony is the Spanish Sahara located south of Morocco on the Atlantic coast of Africa. (See Figure 3) The following statistics pertain to these African colonies:

Colony	Area (Square Mile)	Population (1971)
1. Spanish Sahara	266,000	24,000 — 76,000 (Nomads)
2. Ceuta	19	66,900
3. Melilla	13	64,300 [10 p.1190]




Figure 3

King Hassan of Morocco strongly desires to acquire the Spanish Sahara and appears willing to use force. In September, 1974 he moved tanks, guns, and elements of Moroccan army infantry to the border area. Reservists were called up, blood banks were established, and a military headquarters was set up at Agadir. These actions clearly indicate an intention to go to war with Spain in order to control the Spanish Sahara and its valuable phosphate resources.

Spain has 12,000 well trained and well equipped troops in the territory to counter this serious Moroccan threat. [63 p. 60] There are a total of 30,000 Spanish troops stationed in African territories. [35 p. 33] Spain has been under pressure from the Arab and African nations to relinquish this colony, but there is very little agreement as to who should receive custody or if it should be independent. Spain would probably consider a peaceful arrangement, but a forceful move by any of the neighboring nations will be strongly opposed.

Morocco wants the territory because of the vast phosphate deposits located there. Presently these are mined for commercial fertilizer by Spain and foreign interests. Since Morocco also relies on phosphate mining for export, the Spanish Sahara is a competitive threat as long as Spain controls the territory. If it belonged to Morocco a monopoly situation would exist with associative price control.

The other neighbors of the Spanish Sahara are Algeria and Mauritania. Algeria desires that the nomad population be given the chance to govern themselves. The Mauritani-ans believe they have a valid claim to the area on the grounds of similar racial stock with the inhabitants but they do not appear to be willing to use force to acquire it.

Spain and Morocco also have a conflict of interest concerning fishing rights. This occurred when Morocco unilaterally proclaimed a 70 mile fishing limit. The new ruling resulted in the impounding of numerous Spanish fishing vessels and crews. Negotiations between the two nations resulted in the signing of an agreement in Rabat on January 2, 1974 which will enable 200 Spanish fishing vessels to fish in Moroccan waters within the framework of Spanish-Moroccan cooperation in the joint Maroc-Pêche Company. [46 p. 26342]

Since the Spanish fishing fleet numbers about 800 vessels and 15,000 men, the government is very interested in their economic welfare and is going to subsidize the conversion of about 250 vessels to enable them to fish in more distant waters. The most affected areas are the Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla, and the cities of Malaga and Algeciras on the Spanish coast.

In addition to the recent agreement and cooperation concerning fishing rights, it is interesting to note that Spain and Morocco do agree on security interests as presented at the Helsinki conference on European Security and Co-operation.

Spain's colonies in Africa are economically and politically important. They serve as a source of valuable exportable products as well as a link with the African continent and the Arab world.

Spain is willing to assist its colonies to attain independence or to incorporate them into neighboring nations. Through this cooperation policy and continued association and assistance, Spain has reaped economic benefits. This trend is expected to continue but any move to force Spain to give up valuable territory will be forcefully resisted.

Spain and Algeria signed an agreement in March 1974 which involved the sale of 4,500 million cubic feet of Algerian natural gas a year over the next 20 years. The relation between these two nations remains good. Algeria is not in favor of Spanish Sahara being incorporated by Morocco or partitioned between Morocco and Manitanian. [50 p. 2614]

In summary, Spanish colonies in Africa are important to Spain and do occupy a significant portion of foreign policy decision making. However, there appears to be very little conflict of interest with Spanish integration processes. There is some carry over to the association with the Arab world nations and for this reason Spain tries to maintain a friendly, negotiable appearance.

The Spanish colonies in Africa have drawn international attention through the United Nations. The three neighboring nations of the Spanish Sahara initiated decolonization action that resulted in the repeated demands by the United Nations

General Assembly that Spain hold a referendum in the territory to pole popular support of self-determination. Spain previously accepted the principle of the referendum but consistently refused to specify a date. However, on August 21, 1974 the Spanish government announced that such a referendum would be held in the first half of 1975 under the auspices and guarantees of the United Nations. Spain has also shown increased interest in helping the territory prepare for self-determination by promoting internal autonomy. Morocco interprets these recent events as a Spanish effort to establish a puppet state. King Hassan, under various internal pressures, has now strongly warned Franco not to take any such unilateral action. Spain has gone back to the United Nations with the claim that Morocco is interfering in a United Nations supported Spanish effort in the African territory. [50 p. 2614]

Spain seems to be building a case for reviving the Gibraltar issue. Spain is dealing with its colonies in an approved respectable manner; therefore, Great Britain should also comply. In this light, the colonial question shows deliberate Spanish diplomacy. If they must lose a colony, they will do it in a peaceful, dignified manner thus assuring a continued favorable African relationship as well as a future lever to acquire territory with complete support of the United Nations. Spain is banking on its example with the hope that dividends will be payable in the future.

V. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE U.S.-SPANISH AGREEMENTS

The intent of this thesis is not to evaluate American foreign policy in the European or Mediterranean areas. Therefore, the following assumptions will be made for the purpose of simplification of the evaluation of the effect Spanish integration into Europe will have on the United States as referenced to the issue of American military presence:


1. The United States has a political commitment to counter Soviet influence in Western Europe and to influence political development in the Middle East.
2. An actual military presence in Europe and the Mediterranean is necessary to insure that the political commitment is fulfilled.
3. A naval fleet in the Mediterranean, ground forces in Europe, and air supply and support are necessary to provide a credible military presence.
4. American usage of Spanish military facilities is an important element of the overall military presence.

For the purposes of this analysis, the assumption will also be made that Spain is the changing element; United States policy generally will be considered to be stable concerning the base rights issue. As referenced to the above basic United States foreign policy, the American facilities in Spain are necessary for the overseas projection of power and political influence. The word 'necessary' is used instead of the word 'vital' which has associated final and absolute connotations. 'Necessary' is more descriptive in that there is some allowance for error and reevaluation. Other factors of convenience, economics, and threat also affect the true degree of necessity.

A. PERCEIVED SPANISH NATIONAL GOALS

The first step in forecasting the future prospects for U.S.-Spanish agreements is the analysis of the national goals of Spain as they relate to past events and present foreign policies. The methodology illustrated in Figure 4 will be used in an effort to correlate important factors thereby allowing significant and logical conclusions to be reached. Each goal must be considered in relation to Spanish integration into Europe. In doing so a net change in the shift of the controlling pole affecting Spanish foreign policy will be arrived at. The largest variable factor in Spain's future is the type of government which will be installed. Since the prediction of individual power figures after Franco is very difficult and speculative, analysis of foreign policy will be referenced to the three most probable political positions of a post-Franco government.

The political spectrum of Spain in a simplified manner would appear as follows:



FORECASTING METHODOLOGY




Figure 4

LEFT WING

This pole of the political spectrum has in the past been forced to remain underground and in neighboring nations. Only recently has their visibility increased as the government has begun to allow liberal opposition parties to voice their positions. Political freedom and opposition to the conservative Franco regime are the major immediate goals of the left wing. If power is acquired, internal stability would be a necessity for continued control. The support of the workers gives them power.

TECHNOCRATS

This is the middle position of the Spanish political spectrum. Emphasis is always placed on economic and technological progress. The leaders are generally middle class and are often members of Opus Dei. There is accommodation with the right as well as desire for many of the liberal policies of the left. Economic progress gives them power.

RIGHT WING

This pole is the conservative political position indicative of the present regime. The army is the power element behind the government. The present government is moving cautiously toward the left but is unlikely to cross the center. A few factions are moving toward the far right in a defensive move to counter the growing liberal movement.

As each perceived national goal is discussed relative to the type of government described above a value is assigned to it to indicate its position of importance. The sum total of all goal values will be 1.0; the most important goal is assigned the largest value based on subjective analysis of past positions, statements, and actions. The following table contains a relative value assignment for each goal that must be considered by any future Spanish government.

TABLE 2

PERCEIVED NATIONAL GOALS	TYPE OF GOVERNMENT		
	LEFT WING	TECHNOCRATS	RIGHT WING
PROSPERITY	.3	.4	.2
EQUALITY	.2	.2	.3
INTERNAL STABILITY	.3	.2	.1
SECURITY COMMITMENT	.1	.1	.3
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT	.1	.1	.1
TOTAL	1.0	1.0	1.0

1. Prosperity

The international economic crisis of 1973 faced Spain with the choice between gaining stability by reducing economic activity or maintaining the present growth rate. The Director General of Commercial Policy of Spain, Sr. Hidalgo de Quintana, has stated that Spain will move forward with economic development

in order to take advantage of the economic potential and industrial momentum already established. Both the problems of internal inflation and the rising value of imports will present future obstacles. Spain expects to have a cost of living index exceeding 15 percent and a balance of payments deficit of \$1.5 billion by the end of 1974. [39 p. 7,8]

As illustrated by Table 3 the trade with Europe as a group of nations has a great effect on Spanish international commerce. However, there is a trade deficit each year which must be balanced with other international monetary transfer methods. Table 4 illustrates how important the tourist industry and the Spanish foreign labor force are to the balance of payments. In 1972 these two factors accounted for \$2844 million in trade balance. But now as the European tourists, who can still afford vacations, come to Spain they spend their inflated currencies. The unemployed Spanish foreign labor force is also bringing the effects of European inflation back to Spain in the form of labor unrest.

Cutbacks are being forced on Spanish industry because of decreasing consumer purchasing power and increasing production costs stemming primarily from higher energy prices. Even though foreign investments are still actively solicited by the present administration, world events continue to restrict Spanish economic progress. As the Seat plants layoff workers because of decreased production, unrest and strikes are becoming more frequent; the industries of Spain

TABLE 3

SPANISH TRADE [10 p. 1195]

TOTAL EXTERNAL TRADE (million pesetas)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971*
IMPORT	215444	211828	246547	296306	332300	347415
EXPORT	75212	84659	111244	133012	167078	205645

TRADE WITH INDIVIDUAL NATIONS (million pesetas)

	1955**	1969	1970	1971*	1955**	1969	1970	1971*
FRANCE	205	30067	33154	34161	110	12836	17281	22283
GR. FED. REP.	191	39634	41929	42152	198	14291	19716	25667
ITALY	45	17711	17297	19008	63	6880	10989	13995
BRITAIN	192	22481	23520	27294	222	11962	14741	17375
NETHERLANDS	61	8577	9242	9799	—	5152	8759	10183
BELGIUM	62	6924	7725	8477	43	2685	3596	4854
UNITED STATES	350	50965	62752	53998	137	19957	23566	31540

*Provisional

**[9 p. 941]

TABLE 4
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(Millions dollars)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
1. IMPORTS (fob)	3200	3242	3865	4357	4577	6066
2. EXPORTS (fob)	1419	1667	1994	2483	2978	3812
3. TRADE BALANCE	-1781	-1575	-1871	-1874	-1599	-2254
4. FOREIGN TRAVEL	1110	1111	1195	1543	1878	2245
5. OTHER SERVICES	-236	-226	-225	-250	-191	-195
6. WORKERS REMITTANCES	320	319	400	467	548	599
7. OTHER PRIVATE TRANSFERS	126	129	150	192	224	278
8. OFFICIAL TRANSFERS	4	—	-18	—	-4	-9
TOTAL (4 to 8)	<u>1325</u>	<u>1333</u>	<u>1477</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>2455</u>	<u>2917</u>
10. CURRENT BALANCE	-456	-242	-394	78	856	664

are feeling the strains of recession that are also very evident in Europe and the United States. However, in Spain this has resulted in a more volatile situation because of the following additional factors;

1. There is national insecurity because of the possibility of Franco's death at anytime.
2. There is a growing political party structure in a nation that is politically ignorant. The Spanish people have a real thirst for democracy, but they are confused by the platforms of the well organized opposition parties which are becoming more visible. Since the political liberty which breeds good politicians has been absent

in Spain for so long, the emerging parties must rely on their underground strength.

3. There is a fear of the radical nature of the extreme right and left. The liberalization policies feed the fires of hope for the left and of conservative strength for the right.

The present Spanish government as well as the post-Franco regime must give priority to the goal of prosperity if they are to maintain or acquire the continued support of the people. In order to remain in power in modern Spain the government must realize that the enticed appetites of the Spanish consumer must be fulfilled. Fourteen years of prosperity have given the people what the rest of Europe has enjoyed for a longer period and to a greater extent. The political body that can promise that GNP per capita will continue to rise will have a political base to gain power. This promise must be based on two very important assumptions.

The first is that the national goal of internal stability is achieved and maintained in order that economic prosperity may continue. A civil war or any lesser form of conflict will only deplete Spanish reserves and divert vital resources.

The second assumption is that Europe will come to Spain's aid. If Franco has passed from the scene then expanded prosperity can be expected since nearly all barriers to continued economic integration will have been lifted.

Individual international disputes such as Gibraltar will probably remain but trade generally will not be adversely affected. The aid of the United States in the form of increased trade would not be as important as the European factor because there would be no incentive for United States trade to increase. There is no trade barrier with the United States as there is with Europe in the form of the dislike of Franco and its resulting prohibition of Spanish EC admission. Therefore, trade with the United States could be considered to be at an optimum or even a maximum, but trade with Europe has much greater potential for growth.

Economic integration into Europe is the best policy for a Spanish administration that intends to ensure continued economic prosperity. It is an important goal for any one of the three Spanish political poles. Analysis of past trends indicate that the technocrats have consistently emphasized that economic growth is the most important ambition toward which Spain should always move. Through their strong control of banks, trade, and industry, the moderately liberal technocrats will continue to seek integration with Europe. At the present time they must work within the boundaries of the conservative regime. But as the economy of Spain slows down due to the recession, the government again will have to rely on the leadership of the technocrats to keep Spain moving, just as was the case in the early 1960's. As liberalization policies are instituted, new freedoms will allow greater economic flexibility.

Both the left and the right wings rely on the technocrats for guidance in making political platforms and policies which will insure prosperity. Therefore, regardless of the political pole of the future Spanish government, the technocrats will direct economics toward the international community which has the potential of enabling Spain to grow and prosper. Attainment of this goal will greatly enhance the national efforts to reach other goals. Integration into Europe is, therefore, probably in the future for Spain.

American military presence in Spain can only affect prosperity by providing a rent source. United States trade with Spain would continue regardless of any base rights agreement. Therefore, since all future Spanish governments will have prosperity as a priority national goal, there is less emphasis on maintaining or allowing the United States to use Spanish facilities from an economic standpoint.

The left wing is assigned a value of .3 for prosperity because of its concern for the support of industry and the consumer. If future economic progress can be guaranteed, then the left will have gained a strong power base. Therefore, prosperity is essential to the political strength of the left. It is more important to their position than the right wing because the left is not in control of the government and does not have the successful history that is enjoyed by the right. The support of the technocrats is essential for any platform that insures future Spanish prosperity.

The right wing is assigned a relative value of .2 for prosperity because past success in this area has created the secure feeling that the problem was solved in the 1960's; future prosperity is acknowledged to be important in the maintaining of popular support, but this can be achieved by a continuation of previous policies with minor adjustments for inflation and energy problems. The present regime made this position public when the announcement was made concerning economic policies for 1975. The right wing is confident that the technocrats will not allow a decline in prosperity, and that Spain will continue to advance.

2. Equality and Respect

The equality and respectability of Spain is the greatest concern of the right wing. Past as well as present policies indicate that international isolation angers and frightens the right wing of the political spectrum. This is very obvious because of the visibility of the foreign policies of the Spanish government relative to the European Community and the NATO nations, and the United States.

The political rejection by the European nations has always been a thorn in the side of the Spanish government and the associated right wing. International respectability and membership in the important organizations has always been a national goal which is driven by Spanish pride and belief in the value of Spain to the rest of the world. Spain seeks prestige commensurate with its value as a modern leader of

the nations of the world as well as its past history of importance as an empire.

Since 1953, the United States has been the major source of international equality. The bilateral agreements have provided the Spanish government with a sense of value relative to economic as well as political issues. For this reason the right wing continues to be interested in strong political association with the United States in order that Spain can feel equal with the nations of Europe.

The post-Franco period would find the right wing still seeking United States assistance and at the same time struggling to gain immediate political acceptance from European nations in order to legitimize its continuing claim to govern Spain. Through international status, the other national goals will be achieved. The personage of Franco is the barrier, which when removed will allow progress on both economic and political integration policies with Europe.

The left wing and the technocrats are not as interested in international equality except as it relates to economic wealth. Although there is little evidence to support any value assignment for this goal as a platform of the left wing or the technocrats, the assumption may be made that equality will be sought through the channels of prosperity. As trade increases with Europe, the political relations will strengthen, especially after Franco. Since Europe as a community of

nations is a significant power base, association with it would be a logical move. Time would be required, but the associative ground work has already been established for equality and respectability.

This goal, though not equally important to all three segments of the Spanish political spectrum, may be achieved through the European community; the United States is no longer the only catalyst or means by which international equality and status may be acquired.

3. Internal Stability

Internal stability is the primary goal of the left wing in a post-Franco period. At the present time political organization and strength are the major concerns of this segment of the political spectrum. A power base among the workers must be established and be ready to make an effort to acquire control of the government. If the left wing makes significant power advances, its immediate national goal will be stability. But until that time, instability will favor and promote their policies.

The army will be the greatest factor in the prevention of civil war and chaos. At the present time the Spanish military completely supports the government and the right wing political structure. Therefore, any left wing movements to seize power will be severely repulsed. A gradual campaign to influence the government and the people by the presentation of liberal policies is the safest route for the left. The

government and its institutions must remain intact so as to allow the transformation to occur.

The right wing is assigned a .1 value because of its superior power position and its probable similar status in a post-Franco period. National stability was achieved after the Civil War; there is no fear of any weakening in this absolute control. Stability, therefore, is not a national goal that receives any significant amount of policy study.

The technocrats pursue a similar policy within the framework of the present regime. The army has such great power that there is no fear of any loss of stability. The technocrats would in fact rely on the support of the army if a national concern for economic progress allowed them to assume control of the government.

4. Security Commitment

A security commitment is no longer necessary; there is no military threat to the continental Spain, except for the possibility of attack on United States facilities. A commitment by an international power would mean that Spain is important to that power and therefore worthy of respect. The commitment would serve more as a by-product of an alliance. For this reason the right wing regime has given the national goals of international equality and a security commitment similar high priority. These are the central issues of the Spanish position in the 1975 base rights negotiations. This has been a consistent position since the early 1950's; there

is a high probability that it will continue even after Franco. However, the United States may not be the future provider of security.

Even though previous agreements have never guaranteed that the United States will defend Spain, there is an implied commitment by the mere presence of United States forces. Spain is important to the defense of the West as exemplified by continued United States desire to keep defensive and strategic military elements stationed there. Any attack on Spain would probably be directed toward these facilities; the United States would be forced to defend Spain to preserve its own overseas defense structure. However, this position has never been formalized.

Therefore, in reality a commitment by the United States does exist, but the formality of acknowledgement of the value of Spain and its bases is lacking. Spain has not received the same equality and security that the NATO nations enjoy, even though significant resources and risks are involved and dedicated to the same goal.

After Franco, it is conceivable that political integration into Europe may lead to a commitment by the NATO alliance or even an independent nation such as France. As long as equality is explicit in the agreement, Spain would be very anxious to enter a mutual defense relationship. The United States would then be forced to do the same or else find its presence not desired. The risks involved would be

the same as now, but the equality of the mutual defense agreement would be far more satisfactory than a vague executive agreement.

5. Support on Gibraltar and Sahara

International support on the Gibraltar and Spanish Sahara issues is a minor national goal which is common to nearly all political factions. These issues both invoke Spanish nationalism and the support of the people. The present government is concerned about the welfare of its colonies and is prepared to defend Spanish claims.

The trend of past policies indicates no change; Gibraltar should belong to Spain and the African colonies will remain under Spanish control as long as possible. Since neither the United States nor the European nations will support or promote the Spanish position, the United Nations has been the primary forum. Through careful diplomacy, Spain has shown leadership and dignity in its efforts to influence the member nations.

The right wing government would appreciate a favorable United States position, but the consequences would make such action unwise for the United States. Spain realizes this and has never made this an issue during negotiations.

Future political relations with Europe and especially Britain may lead to a solution of the Gibraltar situation. Since Morocco is within the Arab world, Spain is better off solving the African colony question by itself or through the

United Nations; European nations would not risk publicly supporting the Spanish position for fear of Arab reprisals.

B. U.S. POSITION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

The United States position in future negotiations is a result of a balance between the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Congress. This chapter will present some of the primary considerations of each of these agencies in relation to the expected specific Spanish positions.

When the U.S. Department of Defense states that American military presence in Spain is necessary, the Congress responds with the question "How much will it cost?" and "How much will we be committed?" The rental fee that Spain will request in the form of aid, credit, trade considerations, and military equipment will be an important factor affecting the U.S. position in the 1975 negotiations. Just as in 1970, Spain is anticipated to request more than is expected, but this time there may be more care in not being too forceful with exorbitant demands. The American recession and tight federal budget may force U.S. negotiators to walk away shaking their heads and saying, "The price cannot be paid."

Money is only part of the expected cost for future use of Spanish facilities. Other probable conditions for a base agreement will be:

1. A security commitment which allows Spain to assume an equal status in a mutual relationship. The dignity

of Spain, the glory of the Franco regime, and the demands of the military keep this high on the priority list even though Spain is in no real military danger.

2. A greater Spanish presence at U.S. facilities. Since the bases belong to Spain, integration of the forces would be another means of acknowledgement of equality.
3. A greater voice in the actual missions fulfilled by the resident military element. The present minor participation is unsatisfactory. The Polaris submarines present a problem in that their mission will remain with the United States even if it means their relocation to preserve their singular dedication.
4. A treaty instead of an executive agreement in order to more closely resemble the NATO alliance.

It will now be up to the United States to decide if the basic rental fee can be afforded and whether the proper formality can be given to convey a sense of equality and value to Spain.

There are also many military factors which must be evaluated before a policy on the bases can be formulated. The air force and the navy are concerned about the preservation of the Spanish bases and how they are used. Since the original 1953 agreement, the following factors have been important in the defense related policy decisions on base rights.

1. The closing of bases such as Wheelus.
2. The conflicts in the Mid-East.
3. The growing size of the Soviet navy and their increased presence in the Mediterranean.
4. The declining effectiveness and enthusiasm of NATO.
5. The change from basing strategic bombers in Spain to establishing a ballistic missile submarine replenishment site at Rota.
6. The range and technological advantages of strategic missile systems Polaris, Poseidon, and the future Trident.
7. The lack of port entry privileges for nuclear powered vessels in the Mediterranean.
8. The changes in the size and composition of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the associated supply and support missions.
9. The possibility of base relocation and the cost effectiveness of each option.

The details involved in the above factors are generally classified and, therefore, will not be discussed. It is sufficient to say that when the Department of Defense discusses Spanish base rights with the Department of State, these topics will be important in arriving at a relative value of the United States military presence in Spain as it affects the American defense structure and the projection of power. The State Department then must interface with Congress and the President to arrive at a policy for future negotiations.

There must also be a plan which will outline possibilities that could be used if negotiations fail to arrive at terms which satisfy both nations. The question of base relocation is indeed very complex, especially at a time when most nations reject any foreign military presence regardless of the

benefits. The ballistic missile submarine squadron at Rota may be used as an example of the problems involved. Since the submarine replenishment site is actually located on a tender, it could be moved easily, but the permanent shore facilities must remain according to the agreement. The relocation of such a facility to another European port would probably be very difficult to arrange. Two alternatives include movement to Holy Loch, Scotland where the other replenishment site is located, or move it to the continental United States. The latter choice would be unfavorable because of the long transit time to get on station; political problems could prevent an increase of the United States presence at Holy Loch.

The other military commands could relocate, but they would be scattered to various other area bases; there would be little hope of entire base movement. Commands and functions would have to be combined and reorganized to fill the gaps and absorb the excess. The Defense Department is not anxious to expend time and resources to relocate the United States facilities in Spain.

C. RECENT EVENTS

1. Soviet Influence

Spain now has diplomatic or trade relations with Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Poland, and recently the Peoples Republic of China. Negotiations for a legation in the Soviet Union are presently underway. This

thawing in the strict anti-communism policy during the last five years seems to be in keeping with the trend of all nations to increase communications between East and West. Spain has been slow to respond and is still following a relatively conservative policy.

In 1969 Senor Bravo negotiated an agreement with Moscow which allowed Soviet support ships to take on provisions in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. These vessels then supply combat ships in the area. A further agreement in 1970 provides for a merchant marine office in Madrid. In 1971, Moscow placed an order with the Spanish shipping industry for the construction of two ocean rescue tugs. The Soviet news agency TASS now has an office in Madrid. [8 p. 15]

None of these agreements with the Soviet Union are any threat to Western defense. The relations with the communist nations are concerned with trade and increased communication, both of which enhance Spain's position as a leader. Spain is still very much a part of the West.

2. Present Negotiations

The 1970 base rights agreement expires September 25, 1975. At this time the agreement may be renewed for another five years. Negotiations to accomplish this began in September 1974 and are about to go into the third session in Washington, D.C. The United States negotiation team is headed by Ambassador at Large Robert McCloskey; Spain is represented by the Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina.

On July 9, 1974 an accord on the basic principles of the next agreement was initialed in Madrid by Secretary of State Kissinger and Sr. Cortina. It was later signed by President Nixon and the acting Head of State Juan Carlos. In summary form, this was a statement that the United States and Spain are agreed that the past 21 years of military cooperation have served well the security of both nations and the West, and it should be maintained.

The context of the declaration was not as important as the timing of the publication and the Spanish demand that it be signed by the highest level officials. In June 1974, President Nixon signed a declaration of Atlantic Alliance Principles in Brussels while on his way to the summit conference in Moscow. The NATO alliance was celebrating its 25th anniversary. Therefore, it was an excellent time for Spain to receive acknowledgement of equality with the NATO nations as an important element in the defense of the West. The United States made this concession to the Spanish pride with the hope that it would speed up amicable agreement upon the terms for extending the leases on the military facilities; the effect will be seen in 1975.

The hypothesis that Spain has begun to integrate into the European community is valid. Economic prosperity has been the spearhead of the process which has continued even under adverse political relations. Integration will probably be part of Spain's future. The European acceptance of the future Spanish political structure will be an important factor.

All of the future national goals of Spain may be achieved through greater association with Europe. In particular, economic prosperity and international equality, which are important to all political elements of Spain, can be more readily ensured through Europe than the United States. The recent efforts of the Franco regime to liberalize internal policies of Spain has promoted favorable responses from the governments of Europe. As civil liberties and freedoms increase, the political integration also increases. The stability of the government and its institutions under army guidance is also important in the projection of a national image of continuity. When Franco dies, there will be close international observation of the turnover of power. Since the political power structure now in control will probably remain in power, the trend toward international acceptance and European integration is expected to continue.

It can therefore be concluded that the integration of Spain into Europe will probably decrease the dependence [✱] on the United States as the power through which national goals may be achieved. The changes of heads of state in the European nations in 1974 slowed down the change in dependence, but there is no sign of reversal.

Relations with the United States will continue to be [✱] important to Spain, but there will no longer be the dependence that existed in 1953. Since 1968, Spain has been seeking a much more independent role and has become more interested in developing all options for fulfillment of national goals.

All indicators of the possible foreign policy positions of a post-Franco period lead toward an even greater association with Europe with emphasis on political and economic integration. Therefore, future United States military presence in Spain is less important to the present or future regime of Spain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Alan, Ray. "The Strains in Spain." New Statesman, (Mar. 3, 1972), p. 261.
2. Almond, Gabriel A. "American Character and Foreign Policy." In Politics and the International System, edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1972, Pp. 404-416.
3. Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1960.
4. Brewer, Sam Pope. "Spain: How Good an Ally?" Yale Review, XLI (March, 1952), 348-359.
5. Brown, Russell Marvin, "The United States Military Assistance to Spain." Master's thesis, Naval Post-graduate School, 1970.
6. "Chaliced," The Economist, (Dec. 15, 1973), 38.
7. "Diplomacy Under Difficulties," The Economist, (Aug. 1, 1970), 24.
8. DELETED
9. The Europa Year Book 1959. First Edition. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1959. Pp. 941-942.
10. The Europa Year Book 1973. A World Survey. Vol. I. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1973. Pp. 1188-1222.
11. "Europe's Odd Man Out." The Economist, (Jul. 29, 1972), 33,34.
12. Gallagher, Charles F. "Spain, Development, and the Energy Crisis." Fieldstaff Reports, West Europe Series, VIII, No. 11, 1973.
13. Gallo, Max. Spain Under Franco. Translated by Jean Stewart. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1974.
14. Goldman, Roy E. "U.S. Spanish Base Rights Agreements and the Atlantic Alliance." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (February, 1969), 102-104.

15. Herr, Richard. Spain. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1971.
16. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them." The Economist, (Nov. 13, 1971), 34.
17. International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution. Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1952-1953. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952. Pp. 226-231.
18. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik V. "Spain Today." National Review, (Dec. 22, 1972), 1406.
19. La Souchere, Elena de. An Explanation of Spain. Translated by Eleanor Ross Levieux. New York: Random House Inc., 1964.
20. Lowi, Theodore J. "Basis In Spain." In American Civil-Military Decisions, edited by Harold Stein. University of Alabama Press, 1963. Pp. 667-705.
21. Madariaga, Salavador de. Spain A Modern History. New York: Frederic A. Praeger Inc., 1958.
22. "A Man For a Cold Season." The Economist, (Jan. 5, 1974), 30-33.
23. DELETED
24. Moreno, Francisco Jose. "Spain, Past and Present." Yale Review, LXII (June, 1973), 481-485.
25. Moss, Robert. "Spain Between Past and Future." The Economist, (Feb. 19, 1972), 5-38.
26. Moss, Robert. "The 'Blocked' Society. Spain." European Review, XXIV (Winter, 1973-74), 4-9.
27. New York Times, Jan. 1, 1970-Nov. 30, 1974.
28. "Not Troglodyte." The Economist, (Jan. 12, 1974), 34.
29. Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD Economic Surveys Spain. Paris: Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development, 1974.
30. "The Party Is Over." The Economist, (Oct. 30, 1972), 35.

31. Patton, James M. "The Evolution of United States Foreign Policy Toward Spain 1945 to 1955." Master's thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1966.
32. Paxton, John, ed. The Statesman's Year-Book 1973-1974. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.
33. Payne, Stanley G. Falange. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
34. Payne, Stanley G. "Political Ideology and Economic Modernization in Spain." World Politics, (October, 1972), 153-181.
35. Perceval, Michael. The Spaniards: How They Live and Work. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1974.
36. Pike, Fredrick B. "Capitalism and Consumerism in Spain in the 1960's: What Lessons For Latin American Development?" Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXVI (Winter, 1972), 3-43.
37. Preston, Paul. "Post-Franco Spain: The Tension Mounts." The Nation, (Aug. 17, 1974), 110-113.
38. "The Progressive Policeman." The Economist, (Feb. 16, 1974), 41.
39. Quintana, Hidalgo de. "The Economic Policy of Spain in 1974." Spain-United States Trade Bulletin, (Jul.-Aug., 1974), 7-9.
40. "The Reaction." The Economist, (Dec. 29, 1973), 25.
41. Roberts, Francis. "The Jockeys of Spain." New Statesman, (Aug. 11, 1972), 184.
42. Roland, Paul A. American Military Commitments Abroad. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973.
43. Rossi A. "Report on the Community's Commercial Policy in the Mediterranean." European Parliament Working Documents 1970-1971, (Feb. 1, 1971).
44. "Seats For the Family." The Economist, (Oct. 2, 1974), 40.
45. Spain. Information Service. Fundamental Laws of the State. Political Document No. 8. Madrid: Servicio Informativo Espanol, 1967.

46. Stebbins, Richard P. and Alba Amoia. eds. The World This Year 1973. Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of World Events. XIX. London: Keesing's Pub. Ltd., 1973. Pp. 104, 25960, 25713, 26377, 26341-43.
47. "That's Better." The Economist, (Aug. 15, 1970), 31.
48. "Till God Us Do Part." The Economist, (Oct. 9, 1971), 35.
49. The Times (London). Jan. 1, 1970 - Nov. 30, 1974.
50. Tobin, Herbert C. and Robert J. Fraser. eds. The World This Year 1974. Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of World Events. XX. London: Keesing's Pub. Ltd., 1974. Pp. 26714-15, 26344.
51. Trythall, J.W.D. Franco A Biography. London: Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd., 1970.
52. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. The European Community and the American Interest. Special Study, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
53. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
54. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Agreement Between the United States and Spain. Report, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.
55. U.S. Department of State. "Agreements Concluded With Spain." The Department of State Bulletin, XXIX (October 5, 1953), 435-442.
56. U.S. Department of State. Spain in the Seventies. transcript of proceedings. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.
57. U.S. Department of State. United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
58. U.S. Department of State. United States Foreign Policy 1971. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.

59. U.S. Department of State. United States Foreign Policy 1972. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.
60. U.S. Department of State. "U.S. and Spain Sign Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation." The Department of State Bulletin, LXIII (August 31, 1970), 237-243.
61. Walker, Antonio Garrigues. "The Future of Spain." Spain-U.S. Trade Bulletin, (Sept.-Oct., 1974), 17-24.
62. Walsh, John. "Spain (I): A Developing Economy Puts Spanish on the Threshold." Science, (Jul. 7, 1972), 36-39.
63. "War Next Week?" The Economist, (Sept. 14, 1974), 60.
64. "The Way Back is Hard." The Economist. (Aug. 8, 1970), 13.
65. "What's Spanish For Bandwagon?" The Economist, (Oct. 26, 1974), 39.
66. Whitaker, Arthur P. Spain and Defense of the West. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Documentation Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0212 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of Government Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
4. LT. Mark Janis USNR, Code 56JN Instructor Department of Government Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
5. LT. Donald C.F. Daniel USN, Code 56DL Assistant Professor Department of Government Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 94930	1
6. LT. G.A. Ruskosky USN USS JAMES MONROE SSBN 622 Gold FPO, New York, New York 09501	1
7. Mr. Larry Pezzullo Room 7246 Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520	1
8. Mr. Michael Durky Spanish Desk, Room 5226A Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520	1
9. Chief of Naval Operations Political-Military Policy, Europe OP-614 Room 4E-569, Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20350	1 ✓
10. Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs, Europe Room 4D-776, Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301	1

11. Mr. David Simcox 1
Political Counselor
U.S. Embassy
Madrid, Spain 20521
12. Commander Naval Intelligence Command (NIC 12) 2
Naval Intelligence Headquarters
2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22331

Thesis
R896
c.1

Ruskosky

158300

The integration of
Spain into Europe and
its effect on American
military presence in
Spain.

22 JAN 76

RESERVE

10 MAY 77

24420

1 NOV 77

25160

17 APR 78

25160

25 FEB 79

25978

Thesis
R896
c.1


Ruskosky

158300

The integration of
Spain into Europe and
its effect on American
military presence in
Spain.

thesR896

The integration of Spain into Europe and



3 2768 000 99969 2

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY